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Abstract 
 
The essay examines Spain’s colonial legacy in the long run development of Spanish America. It surveys the 
fiscal and constitutional outcomes of independence and assesses the relative burden imposed by colonialism. 
Constitutional asymmetries between revenue collecting and spending agents constrained de facto 
governments’ power to tax. Inherent disparities embedded in colonial fiscal system worsened with vaguely 
defined representation for subjects and territories and troubled their aggregation into a modern representative 
polity.  Governments with limited fiscal capacity failed to deliver public goods and to equitably distribute 
costs and benefits of independence. Growing indirect taxes, debt and money creation allowed them to 
transfer the fiscal burden to other constituents or future generations. Taxpayers realised the asymmetry 
between private contributions and public goods and hence favoured a low but regressive taxation. 
Comparisons with trajectories in the metropolis and the US are offered to qualify this legacy.  
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This	paper	takes	issue	with	institutionalist	models	to	discuss	the	notion	of	colonial	legacy	
in	setting	the	development	path	of	Latin	America1.	It	conversely	digs	in	the	history	of	
colonial	Spanish	America	searching	for	other	possible	set	of	institutions	which	might	well	
explain	Latin	America	economic	development.	It	builds	on	previous	research	on	the	
political	economy,	taxation	and	governance	of	the	Spanish	Empire	and	echoes	other	
assessments	of	the	region’s	economic	performance	in	the	post‐independence.	Thus	it	
revisits	the	notion	of	Spanish	colonialism	current	in	the	institutionalist	literature.	
Following	their	rationale	it	addresses	how	was	that	–	if	the	colonial	rule	was	so	prejudicial	
for	development	why	independence	did	not	change	the	path?	To	what	extent	this	is	a	
history	of	bad	colonialism	if	it	was	the	case	that	the	metropolis	suffered	very	much	of	the	
same	malaise	–	for	most	of	the	19th	century	at	least	–	and	to	what	extent	fundamentals	of	
the	colonial	political	economy	remained	in	place	after	the	end	of	Spanish	rule.		In	so	doing	
an	analytical	argument	is	offered	on	the	channels	and	mechanisms	of	persistence;	main	
aspect	of	the	institutionalist	interpretation.		
Section	I	briefly	describes	the	governance,	the	economic	basis	and	workings	of	the	colonial	
state	which	permitted	the	territorial	expansion	of	the	empire,	and	organized	the	economy	
under	its	control.	Section	II	discusses	the	exogenous	shock	resulting	from	the	Napoleonic	
occupation	of	Spain	in	1808,	which	inflicted	a	fatal	blow	for	the	continuation	of	the	rule	and	
triggered	major	reforms	in	both	Spain	and	the	colonies	on	its	wake.	It	discusses	
interpretations	of	the	colonial	fiscal	burden	–and	its	release‐	as	the	legacy	of	Independence.	
Section	III	offers	some	first	estimates	of	the	subsequent	fiscal	burden	and	surveys	the	
institutional	changes	on	taxation	and	representation	which	transformed	the	political	
fundamentals	of	the	Spanish	rule.	Focused	on	the	changes	opened	with	the	Cadiz’	
constitution	of	1812	it	compares	fiscal	and	financial	developments	in	the	colonies	and	the	
metropolis	to	point	out	the	debatable	nature	of	a	colonial	legacy	since	both	suffered	very	
similar		problems	–	and	sought	very	similar	solutions.	Section	IV	analyses	institutions	of	
taxation	and	political	representation	in	the	US	before	and	after	the	Revolution	to	highlight	
the	differences	in	fiscal	and	political	matters	with	Spanish	America	‐	making	the	US	a	
problematic	yardstick	to	assess	comparatively	the	institutional	determinants	of	long	run	
development.	The	paper	concludes	with	another	institutional	argument	–	different	from	
the	colonial	origins‐	pointing	at	another	type	of	legacy	that	shaped	the	long	run	economic	
performance	of	Spain	and	her	former	colonies:	that	is	the	inconsistency	between	taxation	
and	representation	in	the	constitutional	setting	implemented	in	the	19th	century	which	
ultimately	engendered	persistent	macroeconomic	instability	with	detrimental	
consequences	visible	to	date.			
	
                                                            
1 Broadly	this	refers	to	well‐known	research	by	Acemoğlu,	Johnson	and	Robinson	and	Engerman	and	Sokoloff	
(various	dates).	
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I	
A	cursory	characterization	of	the	economy	in	this	section	qualifies	some	claims	made	on	
the	nature	of	Spanish	colonialism.	As	shown	elsewhere,	the	governance	that	Spain	
established	in	the	New	World	relied	heavily	on	local	agency	from	co‐opted	subject,	
individuals	and	corporate.	The	economic	structure	organized	by	Spaniards	relied	on	a	
disproportionately	high	land	/	labour	ratio	exacerbated	by	the	collapse	of	native	
population	in	the	16th	century,	a	demographic	shortfall	roughly	three	times	more	dramatic	
than	the	one	caused	by	the	Black	Death.	Population	took	more	than	two	centuries	to	
rebound	to	pre‐conquest	levels	as	recovery	was	constantly	checked	out	by	epidemics.	By	
1800	frontier	regions	as	Northern	Mexico,	Chile,	Venezuela	and	the	River	Plate	populated	
at	faster	rate	and	were	the	fastest	growing	regions	at	the	time	together	with	Cuba	–	which	
with	increasing	African	labour	constituted	another	dynamic	frontier	in	the	empire.		
A	great	deal	of	local	autonomy	in	the	governance	of	colonial	cities	and	villages	replicated	
Spain’s	institutional	order	and	structure	of	representation	founded	in	pueblos	and	towns	
(Quijada	2008).	Citizenry	was	local	and	the	commonwealth	organized	in	a	corporate	order	
led	by	local	notables.	Spanish	rule	relied	on	overlapping	and	competing	authorities,	secular	
and	religious,	administrative	and	judicial,	locally	appointed	(or	purchased)	and	confirmed	
by	the	King,	which	checked	each	other	out.	The	constant	bargaining	among	bodies	and	
individuals,	i.e.	the	governor	and	the	bishop,	the	bishop	and	the	religious	orders,	the	
governor	and	the	courts	(audiencias),	made	the	King	in	Spain	Hispaniarum	et	Indiarum	Rex	
the	authority	of	last	resort;	he	conceded	legality	to	contracts	and	was	the	ultimate	arbiter	
in	the	disputes	among	subjects,	cities/towns	and	corporations2.	By	incorporating	
traditional	institutions	of	authority	and	conflict	resolution	indigenous	people	or	pueblos	
(lit.	towns)	enjoyed	equal	status	than	Europeans	before	the	king	though	were	separated	by	
their	own	judicial	freedoms.	As	the	ecclesiastics,	the	military,	the	guilds	of	merchants	and	
miners,	the	indigenous	pueblos	enjoyed	judicial	and	fiscal	privileges	fueros	and	were	thus	
unequal	before	the	treasury3.	This	did	not	make	the	colonial	society	more	equal;	it	is	just	
that	distinction	were	not	purely	established	by	colour.		
By	the	mid‐	18th	century	taxes	on	external	and	domestic	trade	provided	most	of	fiscal	
revenues.	Mining	as	such	was	never	the	main	source	of	royal	income,	as	it	was	a	private	
venture	and	burden	from	direct	taxes	were	somewhat	offset	by	royal	subsidies	on	
quicksilver.	(Grafe	and	Irigoin	2006).	A	significant	amount	of	revenue	was	redistributed	
within	the	territory	to	near	and	far	distant	settlements	like	Cuba,	California,	Concepcion	
                                                            
2	From	Latin	arbiter,	judge,	supreme	ruler	in	use	in	Medieval	France	and	England.	
3	Unlike	in	the	US,	being	black	did	not	mean	to	be	a	necessarily	a	slave	and	the	first	minority	everywhere	was	
free	people	of	mixed	races.	These	features	challenge	the	triple	colour	division	of	the	colonial	population	in	
Sokoloff,	K.	and	S.	Engerman	(2000).	"Institutions,	Factor	Endowments	and	Paths	of	Development	in	the	New	
World."	Journal	of	Economic	Perspectives	14(3):	217‐232.	
	 	table	3	
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and	Manila.	This	provided	working	capital	to	new	economic	activities	and	attracted	trade	
to	the	ports;	it	financed	the	expansion	of	the	Empire	and	sustained	the	growth	of	existing	
cities	and	of	the	private	mining	enterprise.	Unlike	other	European	empires,	this	was	self	–
and	abundantly‐	financed	economy,	which	continued	stretching	over	the	territory	since	
early	in	the	16th	century.		
Elsewhere	this	state	has	been	characterized	as	‘developmentalist’	as	it	was	deeply	
embedded	in	the	local	economy	and	originated	significant	re‐distributive	effects	in	its	
expansion(Grafe	and	Irigoin	2012);	Central	or	metropolitan	control	was	rather	limited	as	
was	its	rate	of	fiscal	extraction	to	Spain.	A	broadly	defined	‘revenues	from	the	Indies’,	never	
made	more	than	a	fifth	of	metropolitan	revenues	in	the	18th	century.	Yet	these	amounts	
pale	when	compared	with	the	money	collected	in	the	Empire,	as	shown	in	graph	a.	The	
proportion	directly	appropriated	by	the	Spanish	King	represented	a	few	percentage	points	
of	the	revenue	generated	in	the	colonies.		Only	the	lack	of	a	comparison	of	relative	values	
could	give	the	impression	that	there	was	any	sizable	‘extraction’	of	revenues.	Such	was	the	
wealth	of	the	Spanish	American	economy.		
Figure	1	Contribution	from	the	Indies	to	the	Spanish	Treasury,	and	total	and	net	revenues	
in	mainland	America	–	in	thousands	silver	pesos		
	
Source:		data	‘from	Indies’	and	‘from	Spain’	(Marichal	2008)	table	1.1	Appendix;	America	gross	and	
net	revenues	from	Grafe	&	Irigoin	(2006,	2012)	table	1.	Conversion	rate	between	reals	de	vellon	and	
the	Spanish	American	silver	peso	was	20:1	as	indicated	by	Marichal.		
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Colonial	administration	was	in	private	hands;	extended	sale	of	office	plus	tax	collection	and	
spending	outsourced	to	merchants	or	miners	guilds,	local	priests,	and	tax	farmers	all	
resulted	in	the	near	privatization	of	fiscal	functions	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	supply	of	
public	goods	by	the	church	on	the	other,	all	of	which	placed	a	significant	control	of	the	state	
businesses	in	locals’	hands.	Little	European	migration	went	directly	to	newer	remote	areas;	
rather	old	settlements	were	the	springboards	from	where	population	and	capital	were	
raised	to	move	further	inland.	This	Smithian	type	of	growth	expanded	the	private	economic	
activities	engaged	in	the	production	and	trade	of	natural	resources	intensive	goods.	In	so	
doing	the	colonial	state	was	also	expanding	its	fiscal	base	with	the	progressive	creation	of	
treasury	districts.	Unlike	the	process	of	aggregation	or	mergers	in	the	European	(and	US’)	
path	to	state	formation,	revenue	collection	points	multiplied	over	time	in	Spanish	America.	
This	process	accelerated	in	the	18th	C	with	population	growth	‐	hence	the	fiscal	subdivision	
of	Mexico	and	the	River	Plate	‐	a	feature	that	qualifies	the	notion	of	Bourbons’	greater	
centralization.	Spending	was	too	controlled	by	locals	as	imperial	defence	was	organized	
and	run	by	locally	organized	militias	(Grafe	Irigoin,	2012).	
The	extraction	by	the	colonial	state	should	not	be	equated	to	the	economic	exploitation	that	
Spaniards	imposed	on	the	New	World;	Spanish	colonialism	was	indeed	a	highly	private	
enterprise,	locally	run	and	heavily	subsidized	by	the	colonial	treasury.	Since	the	early	16th	
century	the	bulk	of	the	specie	sent	to	Spain	was	made	of	private	treasure,	eg	‘emigrants	
remittances,	savings	of	passengers	and	the	bulk	of	it	from	the	balance	of	trade’	(Hamilton	
1929)(463).	The	proportion	increased	together	with	more	mining	and	trade.	No	chartered	
company	was	established	to	trade	with	America	in	the	fashion	of	the	other	European	
companies	–	until	very	late	and	to	little	effect4,	no	monopoly	exploited	the	production	of	
silver	within	or	its	export	outside	America;	the	single	direct	royal	stake	in	the	mining	
economy	was	the	provision	of	quicksilver	crucial	for	the	amalgamation	of	silver;	nor	had	
capital	to	be	raised	in	the	metropolis	to	establish	a	viable	economic	profit	in	the	colonies	‐	
unlike	most	of	other	European	imperial	ventures	as	pointed	out	by	Adam	Smith.	Indeed,	
this	was	a	very	different	political	economy	than	what	institutionalists	conceive	
By	the	1800s	such	distribution	of	revenues	within	was	assisting	the	fast	growing	new	
regions.	As	pointed	by	Summerhill	(Summerhill	2008),	fiscal	transferences	did	increase	
output	because	revenues	were	flowing	from	lower	productivity	areas	to	areas	with	
potentially	higher	productivity	as	was	the	case	of	Cuba	and	the	River	Plate.	Throughout,	
exports	diversified	beyond	silver	towards	more	land	intensive	commodities	like	wheat,	
copper,	indigo,	cochineal,	tobacco,	sugar,	cacao	and	hides;	and	population	–	and	
                                                            
4	The	Casa	de	Contratación	did	not	own	ships;	it	was	rather	more	a	shipping	agency	for	the	private	fleet	
convoyed	over	the	Atlantic.	The	Real	Compañia	de	la	Habana	briefly	enjoyed	the	monopoly	of	trade	with	Cuba	
from	1740	to	1790,	although	its	decline	was	noticeable	since	1763.	A	Basque	trading	company	was	chartered	
for	the	trade	with	Caracas	in	1728;	it	was	transformed	in	the	Real	Compañia	de	Filipinas	in	1785.	In	1776	
trade	at	Caracas	was	liberalised.		
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particularly	urban	‐	was	growing	fast5.	Customs	yields	in	both	colonies	for	instance	
increased	10	folds	between	1778	and	1805,	and	this	should	be	considered	a	lowest	bound	
for	growth	of	commerce	since	trade	with	‘neutrals’	and	contraband	was	the	norm.	Both	
colonies	‘per	capita	GDP	in	1800	was	higher	than	the	US’	(Coatsworth	1998)	and	higher	
than	any	other	Spanish	settlement	at	the	time.	It	is	a	challenge	to	both	endowments	and	
institutional	models	to	disentangle	how	colonies	of	the	same	empire	with	such	a	different	
set	of	endowments,	free	available	land	and	low	population	in	the	temperate	river	Plate	and	
tropical	agriculture	with	slave	labour	in	Cuba,	could	both	stand	out.	Economic	historians	
have	adhered	to	the	idea	of	trade	openness,	which	somewhat	characterised	both	export	
economies.	But	both	were	also	main	recipients	of	large	revenues	transfer	from	other	
treasuries,	which	ought	to	lower	the	relative	cost	of	capital	locally.		Maps	below	show	the	
relative	importance	of	the	intra‐colonial	transfers	as	proportion	of	net	revenues	in	each	
fiscal	district.			
Figure	2a:	New	Spain	1796‐1800
	
	
	
	
                                                            
5	Cuba’s	slave	population	grew	at	3.7	%	and	free	population	at	2%	per	year	between	1774	and	1792.	(Grafe	
Irigoin	2006	259).	Annual	growth	rates	in	Buenos	Aires	were	respectively	1.8%	to	3.2%	Johnson,	L.	(1979).	
"Estimaciones	de	la	población	de	Buenos	Aires	en	1744,	1778	y	1810	"	Desarrollo	Económico	19	(73	(Apr.	‐	
Jun.,	1979)):	107‐119		
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Figure	2b:	Peru,	Upper	Peru,	Chile	and	River	Plate,	1796‐1800	
	
When	other	European	powers	threatened	the	colonies	in	the	1760s	investments	for	
defence	demanded	a	greater	tax	take	from	the	economy;	Without	a	centralized	
administrative	structure	and	barely	control	of	its	bureaucracy,	further	spending	required	
greater	state	autonomy	with	which	to	extract	more	–	ie.	greater	state	capacity.	In	order	to	
extract	more	the	metropolitan	government	had	to	gain	control	over	collection	from	vested	
interests	or	find	new	sources6.	It	tried	both.	This	is	in	a	nutshell	what	the	so	called	Bourbon	
reforms	sought	and	to	which	the	establishment	of	monopolies	was	decisive:	the	extension	
of	monopolies	on	price	inelastic	goods	as	tobacco	in	the	1760s,	substantially	increased	
revenues	in	districts	such	as	Mexico,	Puebla,	Guanajuato,	Havana,	Manila,	Santiago	de	Chile,	
Caracas,	Santo	Domingo,	Quito.	Start‐up	capital	for	the	production	and	distribution	of	
tobacco	at	imperial	scale	originated	in	Mexico’	treasury	transfers.	This	improvement	
however	did	not	stop	the	dissipation	of	revenues	into	private	hands.	Running		costs	of	
Mexico’	tobacco	factory	consumed	50%	of	its	income	((Deans	Smith	1992)	p54).		
Between	1730	and	1780	the	number	of	fiscal	districts	doubled	from	36	to	71	–	at	least	in	
the	region	covered	by	TePaske	&	Klein	sample.	An	excise	tax,	the	alcabala,	was	extended	to	
                                                            
6	Already	in	1787	Carlos	III	felt	hopeless	about	the	resistance	to	the	(failed)	implementation	the	1749’	Unica	
Contribución	levy	in	Spain.	Cited	in	(Fontana,	1987	p	2)	
8 
 
products	and	taxpayers	formerly	exempted;	the	rate	was	increased	too,	but	its	collection	
remained	farmed	to	individuals	and	local	corporations	like	the	Cabildo	in	Puebla	or	the	
Consulado	in	colonial	capital	cities.	Constrained	by	the	very	(unwritten)	constitutional	
structure	and	centuries	of	–	in	practice	‐	limited	government,	imperial	rivalries	ironically	
pushed	the	Spanish	King	to	greater	dependency	from	his	wealthy	colonial	subjects.		
Colonial	treasuries	borrowed	heavily	from	local	subjects	–in	various	ways	‐	particularly	
from	the	1780s	(Marichal	2008,	Grafe	Irigoin	2012,	(Grieco	2014).	Marichal	(2008)	argues	
that	colonials’	contribution	to	metropolitan	finances	bankrupted	the	Mexican	treasury.	He	
is	not	conclusive	however	in	the	degree	by	which	local	vested	interests	might	have	profited	
from	such	‘extraction’.	Under	Charles	III	treasuries	extracted	a	larger	amount	of	revenues;	
but	at	the	same	time	expenses	increased	even	further;	and	even	if	they	were	only	partly	
appropriated	by	colonial	stakeholders	the	‘reforms’	brought	locals	substantial	
opportunities	to	cream	off	the	newly	expanded	fiscal	capacity.	A	back	on	the	envelope	
calculation	in	table	1	–	considering	the	partial	nature	of	the	data‐	shows	the	impressive	
growth	of	fiscal	income	and	of	spending	throughout	the	18th	century.		
Table	1	total	revenue,	expenses	and	transferences	to	Spain	and	America,	annual	growth	in	
selected	years	in	pesos	
	
		 total	
revenue	
%		 total	expenses % to	America %	 to	Spain %
1691‐
95	
		
43,195,438	
		 	
43,219,682	
		 	
13,059,053	
		
5,047,838
		
1729‐
33	
		
50,394,431	
	
0.4	
	
52,145,319	
	
0.5
	
13,854,670	
	
0.2	 5,548,888
	
2.66
1785‐
89	
		
255,194,445	
	
2.9	
	
220,817,011	
	
2.56	
	
92,207,404	
	
3.4	 11,791,137
	
1.4	
1796‐
800	
		
413,710,965	
	
4.5	
	
384,517,409	
	
5.17	
	
124,655,854	
	
2.8	 21,591,802
	
5.7	
Source	(Grafe	Irigoin,	2012)		
It	seems	paradoxical	that	intra	colonial	transfers	skyrocketed	at	the	time	when	Madrid	
stiffened	metropolitan	control;	they	represented	a	third	of	the	total	money	collected	and	
the	proportion	varied	within	the	districts.	Expenses	grew	even	faster	than	revenues;	and	
despite	the	growth	in	the	royal	remittances	to	Spain	(it	does	not	account	for	private	
monies7)	the	initial	low	levels	make	their	importance	in	the	total	tax	take	relative.		Like	
                                                            
7	Prados	estimates	private	silver	in	1782‐1807	around	16,000,000	pesos	an	amount	slightly	lower	than	that	
of	Spain’	commercial	deficit	Prados	de	la	Escosura,	L.	(1993).	La	perdida	del	Imperio	y	sus	consecuencias	
economicas.	La	Independencia	Americana:	consecuencias	economicas.	S.	Amaral	and	L.	Prados	de	la	Escosura.	
Madrid,	Alianza:	253‐300.	
	 pp	263‐64).	
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Cuba	and	Buenos	Aires,	some	regions	benefited	greatly	at	the	expense	of	others	according	
to	their	participation	in	the	private‐public	partnership	that	managed	the	transfers	(and	the	
treasuries)	in	America.	The	diversion	of	income	from	more	populated	(more	consumers)	
regions	to	coastal	(trading	overseas)	and	administrative	centres	is	visible	in	table	3	below.	
Thus	disproportion	between	costs	and	benefits	among	colonies	was	inbuilt	in	the	system	
and	it	would	inevitably	create	regional	inequalities	once	the	system	failed.		
	
II	
This	happened	in	1808	when	Napoleon	forced	the	abdication	of	King	Charles	IV	and	
imprisoned	his	heir,	future	Ferdinand	VII.		The	population	rejected	the	French	surrogate	
king	with	crucial	institutional	consequences.	The	manoeuvre	was	preventing	the	legitimate	
ruler	to	rule;	without	a	proper	succession	mechanism	as	the	sovereign	was	still	alive,	the	
rejection	to	an	‘illegitimate’	rule	opened	an	unprecedented	constitutional	crisis;	Spain	
waged	their	own	‘War	of	Independence’	in	Europe.	Representatives	of	all	parts	of	the	
Spanish	monarchy	‐	including	the	colonies	on	equal	footing	than	that	of	metropolitan	
Spaniards‐	assembled	in	Cadiz	to	establish	a	provisional	government	of	sorts.	This	congress	
hurried	a	constitution	in	1812	altering	the	nature	of	the	political	regime	towards	a	
somewhat	representative	constitutional	monarchy,	though	the	complete	transition	took	the	
rest	of	the	century.		
In	America	elections	of	deputies	to	the	Cadiz	Congress	gave	way	to	provisional	
governments	in	every	sizable	urban	centre	–	most	of	them	also	treasury	sites.	In	needs	to	
establish	a	new	sovereignty	and	some	form	of	governance	a	number	of	political	and	
constitutional	experiments	developed	(Dye	2006).	Between	1808	and	1830	fifteen	future	
nations	in	South	America	sanctioned	46	constitutions8.		By	1825	most	of	them	had	turned	
into	a	republican	form	of	government,	some	structured	in	a	federal	or	confederal	form,	
others	centralized,	but	for	the	most	these	were	just	designs	on	paper.	Thus	a	centrifugal	
process	of	territorial	fragmentation	triggered	the	political,	fiscal	and	finally	monetary	
disintegration	of	the	empire	and	the	system	of	intra‐colonial	transfers	disappeared	
altogether.	Thereafter,	competition	for	revenues	and	resources	prejudiced	further	the	loss	
of	income	from	missing	transfers;	regional	disparities	evolved	into	civil	war.		
What	were	the	economic	consequences	of	such	exogenous	shock?	Maddison	data	shows	a	
sharp	fall	on	per	capita	GDP	after	1820,	which	helps	to	explain	Latin	American	falling	
behind	in	the	post‐independence	(Coatsworth	1998).	Prados	(Prados	de	la	Escosura	2009)	
challenges	this	notion	as	he	argues	that	region	grew	moderately	on	average	and	in	this	
                                                            
8	Numbers	do	not	include	charters	at	subnational	level.	Source	political	database	EAW	School	of	Foreign	
Service	Georgetown	University	http://sfs.georgetown.edu/	accessed	December	2014	
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period	outperformed	other	parts	of	the	world	with	which	a	comparison	is	more	realistic	
than	using	the	US	as	yardstick9.	Two	other	arguments	he	posed	there	refer	neatly	to	the	
legacy	of	Spanish	colonialism.	Namely	1)	that	net	benefits	from	the	release	of	the	fiscal	and	
trade	burden	imposed	by	the	metropolis	were	offset	by	the	costs	of	establishing	an	
independent	political	regime	and,	a	less	surprising	one,	that	b)	location	and	endowments	
prejudiced	the	efficient	distribution	of	the	expected	gains	from	a	‘less	costly’	integration	
into	the	world	economy.	These	two	issues	have	a	core	on	the	fiscal	developments	resulting	
from	the	end	of	the	colonial	rule	and	are	central	to	the	argument	of	this	paper.		
Prados	is	not	conclusive	about	the	extent	to	which	the	disappearance	of	the	tax	burden	
might	have	brought	relief	to	the	colonies.	Representing	a	35%	of	total	foreign	trade	
between	1783	and	1810,	Spain’	loss	of	her	colonies	did	not	mean	a	major	setback	for	her	
economic	activity10.	Marichal	(2008,	54)	estimates	that	the	burden	the	empire	laid	with	the	
Mexican	taxpayer	was	50%	higher	than	what	was	paid	by	metropolitan	subjects;	3.6	pesos	
per	capita	in	American	against	2.5	in	Spain.	In	an	earlier	article	(Coatsworth	1978)	table	2)	
calculated	that	the	losses	for	Mexico	from	Spanish	restrictive	policies	amounted	to	5	to	7.5	
%	of	GDP	made	by	a	trade	burden	of	3%	of	gdp	or	1.20	pesos	per	capita	and	a	fiscal	
burden	of	1.68	pesos	per	capita	‐	equivalent	to	4.2	per	cent	of	GDP.	This	made	the	burden	
of	the	Spanish	colonialism	‘35	times	greater	than	that	of	Britain’;	yet	the	thirteen	British	
colonies	embarked	in	a	fiscal	rebellion	against	the	metropolis	in	1770s	as	a	result	and	yet	
no	equivalent	reaction	was	ever	recorded	in	Spanish	America.		
	
All	these	authors	expect	that	the	release	of	such	burden	should	bring	economic	advantages	
to	the	independent	governments.	As	Marichal	(2008,	257)	states		
	
	‘If	the	external	transfers	(tax	transfers	to	the	metropolis	and	to	other	Spanish	American	
colonies)	had	not	been	realized,	New	Spain’s	annual	tax	burden	would	have	been	reduced	…		
This	income,	in	the	hands	of	the	taxpayers,	would	certainly	have	generated	greater	
consumption,	but	might	also	have	increased	savings	..	With	regard	to	savings,	it	may	be	
presumed	that	wealthier	groups	would	have	increased	their	silver	holdings	or	invested	
them	in	trade	or	enterprise’.			
	
The	quality	of	comparable	GPD	data	for	all	districts	is	very	uneven	so	a	different	estimate	
has	been	constructed	where	robust	population	data	is	available.		Table	2	shows	estimates	
for	per	capita	net	revenues	and	net	expenditures,	ie	exclusive	of	all	remittances	to	
                                                            
9 Without	a	systematic	assessment	the	argument	is	repeated	for	some	particular	cases	LLopis,	E.	and	C.	
Marichal	(2009).	Latinoamerica	y	Espana	tras	la	independencia,	1821‐1870.	Un	crecimiento	economico	nada	
excepcional.	Madrid,	Marcial	Pons‐Instituto	Mora.	
	 	
10	Prados	concludes	that	‘fiscal	insufficiency	from	a	weak	fiscal	base	together	with	the	weakness	of	Spanish	
manufacturing	at	the	time	may	explain	the	critical	economic	situation	following	the	loss	of	the	empire	in	
mainland	America’	(Prados	1993,	pp	284)	my	translation.	
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neighbouring	treasuries	and	to	Spain	for	the	regions	which	would	be	the	independent	
republics.			
	
Table	2	Gross	and	neta	per	capita	revenues	and	expenditure	by	19th	Century’	political	
aggregates		
	
	 Revenue	
1785‐89	
Revenue	
1796‐
800	
Net	reva
1785‐
89	
Net	reva
1796‐
800	
Expend	
1785‐
89	
Expend	
1796‐
800	
Net	
Expa	
1785‐
89	
Net	
Expa	
1796‐
800
Mexico	 7.90	 11.60	 6.13	 9.15	 5.62	 11.14	 2.57	 6.94	
Chile	 1.71	 5.25	 1.21	 5.11	 1.40	 2.80	 1.28	 2.78	
River	
Plate	
6.90	 8.42	 3.16	 4.29	 5.38	 7.67	 4.87	 7.16	
Bolivia	 5.47	 6.25	 4.31 4.33 3.85 4.14 1.85	 1.73
Peru		 5.39	 3.51	 4.49	 2.28	 3.80	 3.09	 2.98	 2.00	
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	Spain	 	 	 3.17b 2.77	 5.59
Source:	Grafe,	Irigoin	(2012)	table	1	Notes	a)	Net	of	transference	to	Spain	and	other	colonies;	b)	
data	for	1800	
By	the	end	of	the	century	the	fiscal	burden	had	increased	in	Mexico;	but	per	capita	net	
expenditure	–	exclusive	of	transfers‐	grew	even	more.	Largely	privately	managed,	
substantial	remittances	to	Cuba,	other	Caribbean	posts	and	territories	in	today	US,	ought	to	
render	economic	benefit	to	some	(if	not	to	the	average)	Mexicans.	There	is	plenty	of	
qualitative	evidence	showing	the	participation	of	Mexican	merchants	in	the	management,	
transport	and	apportioning	of	these	remittances:	the	financing	of	the	Tobacco	royal	
monopoly	is	a	great	example	(Marichal	and	Grafenstein	2012),	(Irigoin	and	Grafe	2008).	So	
if	gains	were	no	evenly	distributed	is	it	fair	to	assume	that	the	per	capita	burden	was	even?	
Before	addressing	this	point	a	clarification	about	the	role	of	transfers	is	due.		
The	per	capita	tax	take	cannot	capture	the	fiscal	burden	fully	if	equivalent	amounts	were	
ploughed	back	in	the	district	by	means	of	spending.	Colonial	treasuries	rarely	performed	in	
deficit	as	expenditures,	total	and	net	per	capita,	always	matched	revenues.	This	is	a	result	
of	the	very	nature	of	the	data,	ie	reports	of	the	state	of	treasury	to	the	King.	It	is	thus	
anachronistic	to	interpret	the	flow	of	transfers	in	terms	of	deficits	or	surpluses.		Indeed	
treasuries	spent	what	they	got	as	revenues	–cash	flow	needs	were	sourced	from	local	
lending	while	waiting	for	the	remittances	to	clear	the	debts.	This	does	not	mean	that	
treasuries	did	not	borrow	–	as	suggested	by	absence	of	interest	bearing	loans	in	the	
accounts;	they	did	it	by	other	means,	and	heavily	as	will	be	seen	below.		
More	importantly	these	transfers	meant	a	sizable	disparity	in	the	burden	of	the	
contribution	American	subjects	to	the	royal	purse.	As	seen	in	table	3	the	River	Plate,	
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Buenos	Aires	and	Montevideo,	could	(and	did)	spend	well	above	their	genuine	income	–	
and	in	a	substantial	disproportion	of	their	income;	conversely	in	most	of	Bolivian	
treasuries:	revenues	were	not	spent	locally,	ie	only	half	or	less	remained	invested	in	the	
same	district.	Peru	as	a	whole	in	the	1780s	afforded	a	50%	of	extra	spending	over	their	
genuine	means	which	was	shouldered	by	taxpayers	elsewhere.	Overall	locally	raised	
revenues	made	only	half	of	what	treasuries	spent	in	the	region	before	transfers,	so	
arguably	the	regional	distribution	of	the	fiscal	burden	was	indeed	very	uneven.			
Table	3.	Regional	variation	of	tax	burden,	per	capita	revenues	and	expenditures,	and	
transfers	selected	treasuries	c.	1800.		
	 Net	Rev	pc	
@1800	
Net	Exp	pc	
@	1800	
Transfer	pc	
1796‐1800	
annual	avg	
	population	
Arequipa															(Peru)	 5.39 3.87 ‐3.34	 37,721
Cuzco																					(Peru)	 12.15 7.56 ‐5.17	 32,082
Huamanga												(Peru)	 6.80 4.49 ‐5.03	 25,970
Lima																							(Peru)	 5.24 8.87 6.67	 201,259
Trujillo																			(Peru)	 18.13 12.15 ‐10.22	 17,700
Guayaquil														(Ecuador)	 4.06 3.53 n.a	 39,045
La	Paz																					(Bolivia)	 12.32 3.47 ‐5.72	 40,000
Potosi																					(Bolivia)	 18.29 17.03 4.75	 35,000
Concepcion										(Chile)	 5.23 2.76 n.a	 105,114
Chiloe																					(Chile)	 4.38 4.50 n.a	 26,703
Mendoza															(Chile)	 4.61 1.46 ‐0.16	 8,765
Santiago																(Chile)	 9.26 4.28 n.a	 203,732
Buenos	Aires							(River	Plate)	 16.40 28.44 19.85	 72,165
Montevideo										(River	Plate)	 40.31 49 7.32	 14,093
Paraguay															(River	Plate)	 1.03 1.07 0.27	 100,000
Salta																								(River	Plate)	 4.58 3.98 n.a	 13,528
Santa	Fe																	(River	Plate)	 0.07 1.63 ‐0.11	 12,600
Durango																(Mexico)	 2.95 0.24 ‐2.54	 157,970
Guadalajara										(Mexico)	 1.57 0.20 ‐1.21	 623,572
Guanajuato												(Mexico)	 2.36 0.15 ‐1.74	 511,616
Merida																				(Mexico)	 1.06 0.62 n.a	 460,620
Mexico																				(Mexico)	 24.41 24.85 ‐2.81	 1,495,140
Oaxaca																				(Mexico)	 0.92 0.09 ‐0.51	 528,860
Puebla																					(Mexico)	 1.36 0.46 ‐0.09	 821,277
SL	Potosi																(Mexico)	 2.83 0.16 ‐2.68	 311,503
Veracruz																	(Mexico)	 14.35 20.54 2.29	 154,286
Zacatecas																(Mexico)	 9.04 4.58 ‐4.91	 151,749
Notes:	Shade	corresponds	to	the	respective	large	colonial	administrative	unit,	ie.	Viceroyalties;	In	
brackets	the	corresponding	19th	republic,	Source:	Own	estimates	from	Grafe	Irigoin	(2012)	
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Without	uniformity	in	tax	rates	and	exemptions	and	without	a	single	centralized	fiscal	
authority	the	tax	burden	‐	measured	by	the	per	capita	amounts	transferred	and	received	in	
each	district	‐	varied	greatly	within	the	same	larger	region11.		In	fact	regional	inequalities	
were	embedded	in	the	system.	Indigenous	tribute	in	Bolivia	ranged	between	6	and	13.6	
pesos	per	capita	(Klein	1993)	table	3.15),	so	the	average	of	4.30	pesos	for	Bolivia	as	a	
whole	masks	a	substantial	dispersion	in	the	burden	of	colonial	taxation.	Table	3	also	shows	
the	redistributive	effects	of	the	intra	colonial	transfers	throughout.	It	distinguishes	those	
who	gained:	the	capital	and	the	ports,	from	those	who	paid	into;	in	Mexico	for	instance,	the	
big	mining	towns	Durango,	Guanajuato,	Guadalajara,	San	Luis	Potosi	and	Zacatecas,	or	the	
populous	indigenous	districts	of	South	Peru.	The	observed	negative	sign	for	Mexico	City	is	
compensated	by	surpluses	received	in	Veracruz	–	or	Acapulco	for	which	there	is	no	
population	data	available.	From	these	ports	revenues	were	sent	to	Cuba,	Spain	and	to	
Manila	and	worked	as	capital	for	private	trade.	
This	does	not	mean	that	mining	revenues	were	directly	extracted	however.		Collection	of	
indirect	taxes	on	trade	and	consumption	fostered	by	silver	dissemination	within	explains	
the	multiplication	of	treasuries	in	the	interior‐	connecting	mining	towns	and	populated	
consumer	centres	with	coastal	trading	ports.	This	structure	persisted	after	Independence	
and	gave	way	to	a	number	of	internal	customs	within	each	new	republic	–	distorting	
whatever	benefit	from	freer	trade.	Hence	post‐independence	‘free’	trade	legislation	initially	
lowered	the	tariff	at	the	ports,	but	internal	customs	still	taxed	goods	moving	inland.	
Alcabala	as	an	overland	trade	tax	levied	on	domestic	or	foreign	goods	in	transit	persisted	
well	into	the	19thC;	whereas	in	Spain	it	was	abolished	only	in	1845.		Mexicans	living	in	the	
capital	had	to	pay	an	additional	15%	‘introduction’	surtax	on	consumer	goods	entering	the	
city	after	1821	(Sanchez	Santiro	2009)	so	benefits	from	the	‘release	of	the	trade	burden’	
were	lost	in	the	poor	integration	of	domestic	markets.	Thus	colonial	taxation	became	the	
institutional	legacy	which	dissipated	any	gains	to	expect	from	greater	openness	to	the	
international	economy.		
III	
Economic	historians	explaining	the	1820‐1870’	slump	point	at	political‐institutional	
causes:	instability,	warfare,	fiscal	and	financial	disorder.	For	Prados	(2009)	the	‘costs	of	
self‐	government’	and	the	‘costs	of	administering	political	units’	of	a	suboptimal	size	
increased	transaction	costs	that	offset	any	benefits	from	the	release	of	colonial	–trade	and	
fiscal‐	burdens.	Yet,	earlier	scholarship	had	found	positive	externalities	from	‘more	liberal’	
                                                            
11	There	was	neither	a	single	fiscal	jurisdiction	nor	was	there	a	single	constituency	in	Spain.	Taxes	were	
particular	to	individual	territories.	Treasury	relied	on	tax	farming	and	encabezamientos	or	contributions	
made	by	the	ayuntamientos	–	town	council‐	in	proportion	to	the	population.	Attempts	to	centralize	the	
collection	of	taxes	started	in	1742	in	some	Andalusian	and	Castilian	big	towns	without	success.	(Fontana	
1987	p	22‐26)	
14 
 
policies	followed	by	Buenos	Aires	or	Cuba	for	example,	which	distinguished	them	as	
successful	export	economies	from	the	more	backwards	‘closed’	economies	in	the	mainland.	
Some	countries	were	more	effective	than	others	at	creating	‘modern’	institutions	that	
better	protected	private	property	rights	(Bordo	and	Cortes	Conde	2001)	–	away	from	
predatory	caudillos‐		(Amaral	1993);	or	were	more	able	in	setting	market‐	friendlier	
institutions	(Coatsworth	1993).	Export	growth	and	access	to	international	capital	markets	
mirror	their	institutional	success.		
Indeed	nearly	all	the	states	that	emerged	after	1808	in	Spanish	America	–	and	in	the	
metropolis	‐	dealt	with	the	constitutional	crisis	with	similar	institutional	designs.	In	
America	this	was	cue	for	autonomy	from	neighbouring	colonial	authorities	rather	than	for	
independence	from	Spain	since	de‐facto,	the	metropolis	had	very	little	control	over	their	
resources12;	However,	not	all	the	colonies	had	enjoyed	the	benefits	of	being	part	of	the	
same	political	compact	in	the	same	way	as	seen	in	table	3.	It	is	thus	not	surprising	that	the	
Plan	de	Gobierno	de	la	Junta	Tuitiva	of	La	Paz	(Bolivia)	early	in	1809	manifested	their	
decision	to	cease	sending	money	to	Buenos	Aires;	while	renewing	their	allegiance	to	the	
imprisoned	king	(Roca	2007)	p	20).	Each	proclamation	in	the	colonies	following	these	
events	echoes	this	issue	somewhat	–	even	among	those	which	initially	remained	loyal	to	
the	King.		Autonomy	from	colonial	authorities	not	independence	from	Spain	was	the	issue.		
Regions	with	fewer	treasury	districts	and	more	homogenous	size	were	relatively	spared	
from	these	tensions,	like	Chile	or	Ecuador	(Alexander	Rodriguez	1992).	
Both	metropolis	and	colonies	sought	an	institutional	solution	in	the	Cortes	of	Cadiz.	With	
colonial	representation	the	Cortes	sanctioned	a	constitution	to	be	the	foundation	for	a	
provisional	government	for	‘las	Españas’.		The	charter	conceived	representation	of	‘both	
hemispheres’	in	the	Cortes	and	in	the	7‐members’	government	to	provisionally	replace	the	
king	[art	7,	10].	Population	‐as	one	single	constituency	‐	was	to	be	represented	‘in	
proportion’	erasing	the	historical	territorial	jurisdictions,	eg.	one	deputy	every	70,000	
people	according	the	1797	census	for	Spain	however	there	was	no	counting	for	population	
in	America	[art	31].	This	threshold	left	the	majority	of	medium	and	small	size	towns,	the	
majority	of	treasury	districts,	without	representation	[art	32‐33]	and	conferred	the	
political	control	to	big	colonial	cities.	Moreover,	citizenship	as	political	rights	was	granted	
to	all	male	who	were	‘not	broke	or	servant,	nor	unemployed	or	a	felon’;	as	a	mean	to	
incorporate	individual	subjects	to	a	single	constituency	–abrogating	privileges	ie	fueros	–	
was	equally	ambiguous.		There	were	no	property	restrictions	to	suffrage	and	literacy	was	
to	become	a	requirement	only	after	1830	[art	25].	The	mita	and	personal	tribute	were	
abolished.	To	this,	first	constitutional	texts	in	America	added	the	end	of	slave	trade	and	
                                                            
12	It	may	be	slightly	inaccurate	to	assign	to	1808	the	drive	for	Independence	in	the	colonies.	Conservative	
policies	of	the	restoration	governments	in	in	1814	precipitated	such	reaction	which	ended	up	with	the	
separation,	formally,	by	1820	and	the	‘liberal’	revolution	in	Spain.		
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emancipation	of	slaves.	Famously	the	Plan	de	Iguala	in	1821	Mexico	recognized	all	
inhabitants,	Europeans,	Africans	and	indigenous	alike	as	citizens	‘without	distinction’	(art	
12)	and	like	most	early	charters	incorporated	the	vast	majority	of	male	citizens	into	an	
inclusive	but	vaguely	defined	nation‐state.	Similar	liberality	about	of	political	and	civil	
rights	appear	in	early	constitutional	charts	as	Venezuela	(1811),	Antioquia	(1812),	or	Peru	
(1821)	(Perez	Herrero	2015/2009).	
On	these	bases	for	representation	the	Cortes	filled	in	the	legitimacy	vacuum.	The	1812	text	
was	mostly	concerned	with	the	constitutional	role	of	the	king	and	of	the	Cortes.	The	new	
form	of	government	was	a	defined	as	“moderate	monarchy”	(art	14)	and	representation	of	
the	constituents	was	consistent	with	Spanish	tradition	(Guerra	1994).	Direct	election	was	
the	means	to	appoint	new	legitimate	authorities.	Political	historians	have	convincingly	
shown	that	elections	were	a	widespread	practice	of	the	late	18th	century	political	culture	
(Benson	1946;	Posada‐Carbó	1996).	Thus	with	the	1808	crisis	and	across	of	Spanish	
America	now	contested	elections	repeated	in	viceregal	capitals	as	well	as	in	pueblos	de	
indios	or	small	towns	(Warren	1996;	Caplan	2003),	(Echeverri	2015;	Ternavasio	2015	),	
and	(Sartorious	2015)	for	Cuba’	exceptional	case)	and	the	1812	charter	organized	the	
template	for	popular	sovereignty	and	the	recognition	of	equal	political	rights	to	all	citizens	
(Eastman	and	Sobrevilla	Perea	2015).	The	Buenos	Aires	constitution	of	1821	granted	
universal	male	suffrage	–	which	was	replicated	later	in	other	provinces	(Annino	1995).		In	
some	places	participation	was	initially	high	–	eg	Santiago,	Bogota,	Buenos	Aires	‐	but	
turnout	steadily	reduced	over	time13.	Between	1812	and	1854	Mexico	only	sanctioned	35	
electoral	laws	and	statues	that	reformed	mechanism	of	elections	making	procedures	more	
arbitrary	and	placing	ever	more	stringent	restrictions	–	eg.	wealth,	property,	age,	literacy‐	
to	franchise	(Garcia	Orozco	1978).	This	points	out	that	the	exclusionary	character	of	Latin	
American	politics	is	not	a	direct	legacy	of	colonialism;	but	rather	an	outcome	of	19th	
century	politics.		Nonetheless	elections	repeated	at	irregular	intervals;	they	systematically	
occurred	right	after	a	revolution	to	invest	legality	to	the	new	order,	thus	developing	more	a	
perfunctory	role	of	legitimization	ex‐post	(Fowler	2010),(Halperin	Donghi	1979).		Thus	the	
nature	of	the	Spanish	monarchy,	formerly	based	in	privileges	and	hierarchies	of	corporate	
subjects	and	historical	territories	arbitrated	by	the	King	was	altered	for	an	ill‐defined	
popular	sovereignty	in	a	territorial	compact	whose	constituents	were	now	individuals	all	
equal	before	the	treasury.	Yet	the	fiscal	basis	to	sustain	such	state	remained	de‐facto	
unchanged.	Ambiguities	regarding	territorial	and	individual	representation	in	fiscal	
matters	are	one	major	institutional	legacy	of	the	Spanish	Ancien	Regime	and	colonialism.	
                                                            
13	Turnout	in	1820s	Bogota	was	around	15%	Deas	(1996).	The	Role	of	the	Church,	the	Army	and	the	Police	in	
Colombian	Elections,	c.	1850‐1930.	Elections...,.	E.	Posada‐Carbó:	163‐180.	
	 The	1824	Mexican	Constitution	established	biannual	elections	for	Congress,	However,	between	1821	
and	1855	there	were	22	elections.	Aguilar	Rivera,	J.,	Ed.	(2010).	Las	Elecciones	y	el	Gobierno	Representativo	
en	Mexico	(1810‐1910).	Mexico,	CFE‐IFE.	
	 		P	13	
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The	chapter	on	taxation	is	very	short:	only	17	of	a	total	of	371	articles,	and	is	particularly	
ambiguous	about	sources	of	revenues	and	prerogatives	of	the	state	to	collect	taxes.	Cortes	
to	be	elected	was	to	establish	or	‘confirm	taxes,	direct	or	indirect,	provincial	or	municipal’	in	
the	future.	In	practice	the	charter	allowed	for	the	continuation	of	the	existing	taxes	‘until	
new	levies	were	established’.	Consistent	with	the	liberal	rhetoric	taxes	were	to	be	borne	by	
all	Spanish	in	‘proportion	of	their	facultades’	and	the	king’s	prerogative	to	grant	privileges	
and	exemptions	to	individuals	and	corporate	bodies	was	abrogated.	This	aimed	to	establish	
a	uniform	–	and	wider‐	fiscal	base	but	said	nothing	about	particular	fiscal	regimes	in	the	
peninsula	like	the	Basque	or	Navarra’s,	nor	made	any	special	reference	to	the	transfers	
among	(or	out	of)	the	colonies.	Article	11	listed	the	territories	comprising	‘Spain	in	
America,	Asia	and	Europe’	and	postponed	‘the	division	of	this	territory	by	a	constitutional	
law	for	a	convenient	time	political	circumstances	permitting’.	Notably	article	340	
established	that	‘taxes	were	to	be	proportional	to	expenditures’	disregarding	the	
identity	principle	that	treasuries	need	to	collect	in	order	to	spend14.		Territories	were	to	be	
subject	to	an	unspecified	direct	contribution	‘contribución	directa’	to	be	apportioned	
among	the	provinces	‘according	to	their	wealth’	without	any	indication	of	its	source	or	
mechanism	to	assess	it.			
Aiming	for	greater	centralization	one	general	treasury	was	to	be	created	at	the	top	of	
similar	single	treasury	in	each	of	the	unspecified	provinces;	however,	collection	remained	
in	the	hands	of	the	towns,	ie	ayuntamientos	and	cabildos	[art	321‐323].	Revenues	should	
thereafter	be	sent	to	the	main	treasury	districts	where	authorities	decided	over	their	
spending.	This	additional	lack	of	identity	between	agents	who	spent	and	who	collected	
revenues	was	to	be	crucial	thereafter.		Article	354	abolished	all	Customs	‘other	than	
maritime	and	at	the	borders’,	but	the	borders	were	not	defined	[art	11];	so	in	America	
internal	customs	appeared	between	former	treasury	districts	‐now	autonomous‐	and	the	
fiscal	autonomy	of	historical	territories	in	the	metropolis	persisted.		The	charter	admitted	
that	the	public	debt	was	‘a	matter	of	the	first	order	importance’	(particularly	after	the	failed	
consolidation	of	the	vales	reales)	however	it	did	not	earmark	revenues	for	a	sinking	fund	‐	
or	made	any	effective	decision	on	the	debt	that	mattered.		Notably	as	per	article	131	the	
Cortes	was	to	determine	the	value,	weight,	fineness	and	denomination	of	the	coins,	without	
a	mint	or	a	bank	with	which	to	implement	it.		A	final	very	short	chapter	on	education	with	6	
articles	[366‐371]	promised	free	access	to	primary	schools	and	even	allowed	for	the	
creation	of	universities	but	without	indication	of	the	means	with	which	to	do	it.		
But	two	major	constitutional	issues	were	not	resolved:	the	representation	and	the	
aggregation	of	territories	and	subjects	constituents	of	this	state	and	the	means	to	fund	it	
accordingly.	This	double	ambiguity	meant	an	unsurmountable	limitation	to	the	fiscal	
                                                            
14	Official	budgets	in	1840s	Spain	still	conceived	nearly	a	50%	deficit	without	any	provision	to	meet	the	gap.	
(Tedde,	1994	p	32‐33)	
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sovereignty	of	the	state	which	only	exacerbated	the	ongoing	institutional	crisis:	Existing	
economic	and	fiscal	disparities	among	districts	made	even	less	feasible	to	incorporate	them	
into	new	sovereign	polities.	Deep	local	roots	of	the	structure	of	taxation	from	pervasive	tax	
farming,	sale	of	office	and	privileges	were	a	formidable	obstacle	to	any	negotiation	
thereafter	about	some	territorial	integration	of	treasuries.		With	local	autonomy	–	and	
without	a	clear	sovereign	‐	the	fiscal	compact	disintegrated.	Lacking	legitimacy,	public	
property	rights	to	taxation	disappeared	and	without	transfers	from	other	districts	
governments’	income	everywhere	reduced	sharply.	Legitimacy	to	rule	and	to	tax	was	put	
into	question	and	any	successive	political	aggregation	at	a	broader	regional	scale	like	the	
Gran	Colombia,	the	Central	America	Confederation	and	the	Provincias	Unidas	del	Rio	de	la	
Plata,	failed	soon.			
These	were	the	costs	of	independence;	but	focusing	on	the	disintegration	of	the	empire	has	
overshadowed	that	the	political	and	fiscal	history	of	the	metropolis	is	very	comparable:	
there	too	the	process	of	political	‘aggregation’	and	fiscal	constitution	of	a	popular	
sovereignty	proved	as	haphazard.		The	failure	of	every	political	compromise	led	to	war	
over	resources	and	revenues;	and	military	spending	fuelled	public	deficits	and	mounting	
debts.	But	war	and	disorder	have	not	been	an	impediment	for	the	making	of	strong	states	‐	
and	successful	economic	development‐	as	the	literature	on	the	fiscal	military	states	in	
modern	Europe	attests.	Unable	to	pay	for	allegiance	or	recruits	revolutionary	governments	
in	America	offered	very	generous	entitlements	to	large	sectors	of	the	population.	Tax	
exemptions,	tariff	reductions,	and	entitlements,	ie	a	wide	definition	of	citizenry	to	all	
Americans,	elimination	of	tribute,	emancipation	of	slaves,	direct	elections	to	appoint	army	
officials,	etc	not	always	gave	immediate	yield	to	the	treasury	but	helped	out	to	mobilize	
support	without	money.	They	also	created	a	significant	if	confuse	set	of	rights	–	civil,	social	
and	political‐	available	to	all	individuals	in	their	own	transition	from	subjects	of	the	King	to	
citizens	of	the	republican	states.		
IV	
Representation	without	taxation	
Seeking	to	broaden	the	fiscal	base	of	the	republican	state,	governments	in	the	1820s	tried	
to	move	away	from	indirect	trade	and	consumption	taxes	to	more	direct	contributions	‐	
echoing	the	rhetoric	about	representation	of	the	1812	charter.	Probably	the	most	dramatic	
reform	program	was	General	Sucre’s	in	Bolivia,	which	abolished	the	mita,	the	tobacco	
monopoly	and	the	alcabala	together	with	the	indigenous	tribute;	Instead,	it	devised	a	
direct,	universal	levy	on	every	Bolivian	–	the	non‐descript	contribución	directa‐	which	was	
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rejected	by	all	parties	affected	and	was	abolished	within	three	years.15		Under	Spanish	rule	
indigenous	people	paid	tribute	but	had	been	exempted	from	alcabala;	the	rest	white,	free	
blacks	and	mestizos	alike	paid	this	sale	tax	but	did	not	pay	any	head	taxes.	In	Mexico,	the	
1821	Federal	Constitution	abolished	the	tribute	and	granted	the	levy	of	direct	taxes	to	state	
(provincial)	governments;	however	regional	elites	rejected	the	new	taxation	and	by	the	
1830s	most	states	had	increased	further	the	indirect	contributions	like	alcabalas	and	
monopolies.	Few	populous	states	like	Oaxaca	and	Yucatan	continued	the	indigenous	
capitation	and	the	tithe	from	which	they	obtained	the	bulk	of	their	income	well	into	the	
1840s		(Serrano	Ortega	2007).	Tribute	was	also	abolished	in	Ecuador	in	1823	‐	to	be	re‐
established	within	three	or	four	years	–	and	in	Peru	by	the	1821	reforms	together	with	the	
alcabala.	Yet	tribute	did	not	cease	completely	until	1895	(Contreras	2006).	This	contrast	
between	Mexico	and	Peru	is	explained	by	the	greater	commercial	orientation	of	the	
Mexican	indigenous	economy.	The	relative	greater	dispersion	of	silver	mining	in	Mexico	
may	also	explain	the	choice	for	the	persistence	of	the	alcabala	until	the	1857	constitution	
(in	paper)	and	beyond,	until	1896	in	practice16.	In	any	case	this	feature,	which	troubled	the	
integration	of	the	domestic	economy,	mirrors	the	different	degree	of	centralization	than	
Peru	enjoyed	over	Mexico	‐	and	the	respective	path	in	their	constitutional	designs17.		
The	1820s	fiscal	reforms	in	Latin	America	‐	e.g		Rivadavia’s	in	Buenos	Aires,	San	Martin’s	in	
Peru	(Anna	1974),	Santander’s	in	Colombia		(Bushnell	1953/1970),	Sucre	in	Bolivia	
(Lofstrom	1970)	‐	failed	on	three	main	issues:	to	establish	direct	taxation,	to	increase	
revenues	collection	and	to	build	fiscal	capacity.	The	same	happened	with	the	1813	reform	
in	Spain.	Paradoxically	the	failure	reinforced	central	governments’	dependence	on	Customs	
and	on	monopolies	even	further	(Centeno	2002).		Tariff	in	the	hands	of	central	
governments	continuously	increased	throughout.	Taxes	mainly	levied	on	imports	made	at	
least	half	of	the	revenues	as	in	Mexico	and	80%	of	revenues	in	most	other	countries.	With	
the	continuation	of	the	colonial	alcabala	the	fiscal	burden	fell	squarely	on	consumers.	Few	
like	Peru	obtained	similar	income	from	taxes	on	Guano	exports	after	1850	or	Chile,	later,	
with	similar	near	monopolistic	position	in	the	production	of	nitrates.	For	most	of	the	
                                                            
15	It	consisted	of	a	vaguely	defined	personal	or	head	tax,	partly	a	property	tax,	and	partly	an	income	tax.	
Indigenous	villages	rejected	them	to	keep	ownership	of	communal	lands	Sanchez	Albornoz,	N.	(1978).	Indios	
y	Tributos	en	el	Alto	Peru.	Lima,	Instituto	de	Estudios	Peruanos.	
	 ,	Platt,	T.	(1982).	Estado	boliviano	y	ayllu	andino:	Tierra	y	tributo	en	el	norte	de	Potosı́.	La	Paz,	
Instituto	de	Estudios	Peruanos.	
	 	
16	Jauregui,	L.	(2010).	"Mexico:	la	experiencia	de	las	participaciones	federales	en	el	siglo	XIX."	Illes	Imperis	13:	
137‐157.	
	 	
17	Republican	governments	in	both	cases	replaced	the	mining	tithe	–	which	was	collected	by	the	church‐	for	a	
3%	tax.	Contreras,	C.	(1999).	La	Mineria	Hispanoamericana	después	de	la	Independencia.	Estudio	
comparativo	de	Bolivia,	Chile,	México	y	Peru.	Dos	decadas	de	investigación	en	historia	economica	comparada	
en	America	Latina,	homenaje	a	Carlos	S.	Assadourian.	M.	Bornemann.	Mexico.	
	 .	
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period	in	Chile	and	Mexico	the	colonial	tobacco	monopoly	still	made	for	60%	or	more	of	
total	revenues	(Tenenbaum	1986).	Together	with	the	salt	monopoly	it	formed	60%	of	
revenues	in	Colombia	until	the	1850s.	Elsewhere	land	sales,	either	public	as	in	the	River	
Plate	or	expropriated	to	the	church	as	in	Bolivia	or	to	Indigenous	villages	as	in	Colombia	
(Halperin	1979),	(Abendroth	1990;	Kalmanovitz	2006)	occasionally	rendered	additional	
revenues.		
Yet	the	per	capita	tax	take	of	republican	governments	was	lower	than	what	the	colonial	
treasury	had	extracted.	Assembling	information	from	a	patchwork	of	sources	for	
population	and	revenues	table	4	shows	the	estimated	fiscal	burden	for	comparable	districts	
in	years	for	which	data	are	available.	Caution	is	on	order	as	robustness	of	the	indicators	is	
debatable	so	real	values	are	no	more	than	a	makeshift18.	These	are	all	nominal	values	but	
price	data	is	even	paltrier;	possibly	the	best	available	estimate	of	19th	century	living	
standards	is	Peru’s	(Gootenberg	1990)which	basically	counts	for	prices	in	Lima	only.	Yet	
comparing	with	estimates	displayed	in	table	2	the	government’s	tax	take	had	reduced	
dramatically	in	the	Mexican	Federation,	Chile,	Peru	and	Bolivia,	and	this	repeats	when	
comparing	the	colonial	fiscal	burden	at	district	level	shown	in	table	3	above.	Veracruz’	
dramatic	fall	mirrors	the	end	of	the	intra‐colonial	transfers;	other	Mexican	states	
government	had	lost	half	or	more	of	their	nominal	value	in	1800	in	spite	of	that	population	
remained	stable	or	migrated	to	larger	cities.		
Table	4	Estimated	per	capita	fiscal	burden,	Spanish	America	1820‐1850.		
	 	 Gross	
revenue	
pop	 	 Per	capita	
revenue	
Real	pc	
revenue	
Chile		 1800 	 5.11* 	
	 1835	 2003421 1010332 1.98 	
	 1843	 3063568	 1038801 	 2.94	 	
Mexico																1800												 	 	 	 9.15*	 **	
	 1825	 8567954	 6500000 	 1.31	 11.64	
	 1827	 15173469	 8000000 	 1.89	 1.51	
	 1830	 17776870	 7996000 	 2.22	 2.36	
	 1831	 16040591	 6382284 	 2.51	 2.22	
	 1834	 17737883	 7734292 	 2.29	 3.48	
	 1842	 18865148 7015509 2.68 2.7	
	 1844	 22194712 7000000 3.17 3.63	
	 1841‐44	 19262682	 7015509 	 2.74	 4.46	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
                                                            
18	Unlike	colonial	data	used	in	table	3,	table	4	data	states	indiscriminately	gross	revenue	and	includes	
carryovers	and	financial	income	of	all	sorts.	Systematic	counting	of	the	population	–itself	a	measure	of	state	
capacity‐	started	only	in	the	second	half	of	the	century	in	most	republics.		
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BuenosAires		 1800	 2782669a	 72615	 	 	38.55*	 38.55	
	 1819	 2408242b	 125000 19.26 19.26	
	 1829	 7915579 153000 51.73 13.90	
Bolivia	 1800	 	 	 	 4.33*	 	
	 1827	 1867041	 1100000 	 1.69	 	
	 1846	 2363034	 1378896 	 1.71	 	
Peru		 1800	 	 	 	 2.28*	 1.73	
	 1826	 3346032	 1500000 	 2.23	 1.98	
	 1830	 3003489	 1249723 	 2.40	 2.40	
	 1831	 3526148	 1373736 	 2.56	 2.65	
	 1846	 5515591	 1373736 	 4.01	 4.93	
	 1850	 7029112 2001123 3.51 4.28	
Mexican	
states	
	 	 	
Durango	 1800	 	 	 	 2.95*	
	 1825‐26	 312479	 120157	 	 2.60	 	
	 1833	 391091	 139081	 	 2.81	 	
Mexico		 1826‐27	 892130	 829458	 	 1.07	 	
	 1833‐34	 728270	 1039758 	 0.70	 	
Guanajuato	 1800	 	 	 	 2.36*	
	 1829	 733444	 442916	 	 1.65	 	
	 1831	 654853 494823 1.32 	
Jalisco/	
Guadalajara	
1800 	 1.57*
	 1830	 614858	 656881	 	 0.93	 	
	 1831	 505443	 660595	 	 0.76	 	
	 1834	 532600	 680000	 	 0.78	 	
Puebla	 1800	 	 	 	 1.36*	
	 1825	 405618	 584358	 	 0.69	 	
S.Luis	Potosi	 1800	 	 	 	 	2.83*	
	 1828	 470050	 297593	 	 1.57	 	
	 1830	 448500	 310196	 	 1.44	 	
Veracruz	 1830	 241659 242658 0.99 	
Zacatecas	 1800 	 9.04*
	 1825	 620018	 247295	 	 2.50	 	
	 1826	 689032	 272901	 	 2.52	 	
	 1830	 844049	 274537	 	 3.07	 	
	 1832	 1476757	 314121	 	 4.70	 	
Notes:	*	data	from	annual	average	‘net	per	capita	revenues’	1796‐1800	Ibid	table	2;	**	Mexico	
adjusted	by	annual	CPI	value	in	silver	grains	index	from	(Challu	and	Gomez	Galvarriato	2015),	***	
Peru:	adjusted	by	annual	inflation	index	from	(Gootenberg	1990	table	3);	a)	Annual	average	net	per	
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capita	revenue	for	Buenos	Aires	only,	b)	data	for	1822	(Burgin	table	7)*	M.	Burgin,	The	Economic	
Aspects	of	Argentine	Federalism,	1820‐1850	(Cambridge,	1947)p	53	
	
Back	in	1989	Jacobsen	had	estimated	that	per	capita	collection	of	revenues	in	Peru	had	
fallen	from	“28.9	reals	in	the	mid‐1790s	to	23.3	reals	in	1850”.	This	nearly	20%	reduction	
in	the	nominal	value	of	the	collection	represented	about	43%	in	real	terms	as	he	assumed	
“a	30	%	inflation	rate	for	the	period	1800s	and	1850s”	(Jacobsen	1989)p	315).	More	recent	
data	shows	successive	cycles	of	deflation	and	inflation	as	result	of	lower	levels	of	silver	in	
circulation	and	inflationary	financing	of	wars	before	the	Guano	boom	(Gootenberg	1990,	
28‐30).	This	explains	the	relatively	higher	tax	burden	of	the	1840s.	Otherwise,	like	in	
Mexico	the	tax	take	of	the	republican	government	was	a	fraction	of	the	colonial	burden	in	
spite	of	moderate	price	inflation	(Challu	Gomez	Galvarriato	2015).			
In	Spain,	the	Mon	Santillan	1843‐45	reforms	–	together	with	a	new	constitution‐	abolished	
internal	customs	by	the	discontinuation	of	alcabalas;	exemptions	and	tax	farming	still	in	
hands	of	the	church	and	individuals	ceased	granting	a	slightly	greater	control	to	the	central	
government	(Serrano	2015/2009).	Yet	still	in	the	1850s	the	bulk	of	revenues	originated	in	
Custom,	monopolies	and	a	other	consumption	taxes	(Yun	Casalilla,	O'Brien	et	al.	2012).	A	
new	direct	tax	‘contribución	territorial’	did	not	yield;	this	ill‐defined	levy	on	land	property	
(not	on	income	or	capital)	left	the	valuation	and	collection	of	taxes	in	the	hands	of	
ayuntamientos.	Various	disentailments	of	royal	and	Church	real	estate	(1811,	1836‐37,	
1841,	1855)	to	pay	for	old	debts	or	paid	with	depreciated	scrip	provided	some	occasional	
income.	But	as	in	Spanish	America	large	sales	of	lands	distorted	land	markets	and	fostered	
concentration	of	assets.		
Everywhere	‘Liberals	and	Absolutist’	(or	conservative)	governments	alike	faced	the	same	
fiscal	problems	and	resolved	them	very	much	in	the	same	fashion:	repeated	insolvency,	
further	indebtedness	and	further	indirect	taxes19.	This	was	not	a	matter	of	politics	or	
ideologies.	In	Buenos	Aires	for	instance	the	same	individual	Manuel	Garcia	was	responsible	
of	the	Finances	for	fifteen	years	and	served	under	diametrically	different	governments	–in	
the	eyes	of	political	historians	‐	that	of	Rivadavia	and	Rosas	(Irigoin	2000).	Yet	frequent	
change	of	governments	in	both	former	colonies	and	metropolis	are	a	symptom	of	
protracted	instability.	But	changes	in	the	responsible	of	the	Treasury	intimate	that	this	was	
far	from	a	legacy	of	colonialism.	Between	1827	and	1855	Mexico	had	49	different	
governments	and	119	ministers	of	finance,	who	lasted	in	office	an	average	of	4	months	if	
the	government	was	constitutionally	appointed,	or	barely	3	weeks	in	the	facto	regimes.	In	
                                                            
19	In	Spain	the	government	unilaterally	restructured	the	debt	as	in	1818,	repudiated	(partly)	it	in	1828,	
defaulted	or	nearly	defaulted	in	1836	and	1847.	
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the	metropolis,	between	the	French	withdrawal	in	1814	and	the	1868	revolution,	there	
were	54	cabinets	and	92	different	ministers	of	Finances20.		
Indeed	both	Spanish	and	Spanish	American	governments	became	insolvent	in	the	wake	of	
the	crisis	following	the	Napoleonic	occupation	of	Spain;	and	their	commercial	and	fiscal	
deficits	continued	sternly	(Comin	1988).	Both	colonies	and	metropolis	amassed	huge	
domestic	debts	and	borrowed	heavily	in	European	capital	markets;	cash	strapped	Spanish	
American	republics	found	ready	money	in	London	in	the	1820s	–	and	applied	fresh	funds	to	
make	the	reforms	viable;	within	few	years	all	them	defaulted	and	remained	sealed	off	from	
further	foreign	borrowing	for	the	next	forty	years	(Marichal	1989).Only	when	governments	
could	restore	some	soundness	to	their	treasuries,	they	became	again	credible	borrowers	in	
London.		Spanish	governments	could	do	slightly	better:	they	repeatedly	defaulted	or	
repudiated	the	domestic	debt	(1836,	1840)	(Tedde	de	Lorca	and	Marichal	1994)	p	64).	
Spain	too	could	borrow	in	London	in	the	1820s	–	and	in	France	in	the	early	1830s;	adding	
this	debt	to	the	arrears	from	the	Dutch	loans	of	the	1800s	(Canga	Arguelles	1833)‐	but	lost	
direct	access	to	foreign	finance	in	the	late	1830s	(Platt	1983)	p124).	Thereafter	the	
government	could	only	survive	with	short	run	lending	from	the	house	of	Rothschild	–	but	at	
a	significant	fiscal	cost:	the	loss	of	revenues	from	one	of	the	world’s	most	important	
quicksilver	deposits21.		
Taxation	without	consent	
In	the	1820s	most	of	the	republics	also	consolidated	the	debt	–including	arrears	from	old	
colonial	claims.	In	Mexico	by	1816	it	represented	120%	of	the	total	revenues	of	the	
Mexican	treasury	in	the	bountiful	years	of	1800s;	the	proportion	was	300%	for	Lima	in	
1821	and	150%	in	Buenos	Aires22.	The	three	treasuries	had	been	large	recipients	of	
transfers	before	1810	so	without	these	extra‐revenues	the	debt	burden	was	several	times	
larger	in	the	1820s	[Grafe	Irigoin	2012	p	629].	As	part	of	the	reforms	some	republican	
governments	launched	their	first	public	debt	issues.	Early	on	Buenos	Aires	chartered	a	
private	bank	of	issue	and	established	a	Stock	Exchange	as	marketplace	for	public	funds	and	
                                                            
20	Numbers	count	the	ministers,	some	individual	names	repeated	in	the	post.		For	Mexico	Stevens,	D.	(1991).	
Origins	of	Instability	in	Early	Republican	Mexico.	Durhan,	Duke	University	Press.	
	 		for	Spain:	Urquijo	Goitia,JR		Diccionario	Biografico	de	los	ministros	espanoles	en	la	edad	
contemporanea	(1808‐2000)	www.ih.csic.es/lineas/jurg/diccionario/index_dic.htm	accessed	January	2015		
21	In	1835	Almaden’	mines	were	leased	to	Rothschild.		Mercury	was	a	critical	input	for	the	refining	of	silver	
and	the	house	controlled	the	refining	of	precious	metals	in	Paris	and	London	which	made	it	dominant	in	the	
exchange	business	in	Europe.	Lopez	Morell,	M.	(2013).	The	House	of	Rothschild	in	Spain,	1812‐1941.	
Burlington,	Ashgate.	
	 ,	p83	fig.12.10)				
22	The	amount	of	the	certified	debt	was	21.6	million	pesos	in	Mexico,	21.7	millions	in	Peru	and	4	million	in	
Buenos	Aires	(Grafe	Irigoin	2012).	Using	Coatsworth’	1998	GDP	data	these	stand	at	10%	of	Mexican	GDP,	
50%	of	Peru’s	GDP	and	16%	of	Argentina’	GDP.	Spain’	amounted	to	13,120	million	reals	but	60%	of	it	was	
repudiated	by	the	government	in	1828	(Tedde	1994	p12)	
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foreign	exchange.	The	funded	debt	in	1821	amounted	to	twice	as	much	as	the	yearly	
treasury	revenue	at	the	time.	By	1840	it	had	multiplied	ten‐fold	as	it	helped	to	fund	the	
Customs	shortfall	from	European	blockades	to	the	port.	Unsurprisingly	bonds	as	financial	
resource	vanished;	a	20	times	increase	in	the	volume	of	the	fiduciary	currency	issued	by	
the	bank	and	a	subsequent		depreciation	of	the	exchange	rate	to	gold	that	fell	from	17	to	
370	pesos	in	the	same	period	annihilated	the	domestic	market	for	government	debt	
(Irigoin	2000).			
Spain’s	domestic	debt	by	1821	–	which	included	the	principal	and	arrears	of	the	failed	
Vales	Reales‐	represented	about	the	same	amount	that	annual	revenues	(Tedde	1999,	12,	
Prados	1993,	Table	10).	Then	the	metropolis	had	lost	the	fiscal	returns	from	re‐exports	of	
other	European	goods	to	the	colonies	and	revenues	from	trade	services	had	collapsed.	
Spain	could	still	borrow	abroad	for	a	while.	After	1834	short	term	bills	–	mainly	from	
France	‐	multiplied	the	nominal	volume	of	external	debt.	It	was	already	20	times	larger	
than	in	1821	and	it	grew	50	%	further	in	the	subsequent	fifteen	years	(Sardá	Dexeus	1948)	
p	60,	90).	Established	in	1829	on	the	remains	of	the	failed	Banco	de	San	Carlos,	the	Banco	
de	San	Fernando	‐with	limited	large	operations	confined	to	Madrid‐	issued	notes	to	lend	to	
the	government	without	building	equivalent	metallic	reserves.	(Tedde,	1994,	30,	Sarda,	
1948,	32).	The	bank	assisted	the	government	during	the	Carlista	war	and	it	helped	further	
with	an	extraordinary	expansion	of	notes	without	reserves	–	as	fiduciary	money	in	1844‐
47	(Tedde	1994	table	1.4,	Sarda,	1948,	94).	It	was	merged	with	the	Banco	de	Isabel	II	in	
1847	which	had	multiplied	its	issues	even	more.	Funding	the	government	debt	represented	
60‐70%	of	the	bank’s	assets	and	crippled	the	peculiar	banking	system	of	the	country	as	
Tedde	has	painstakingly	described.	Unsurprisingly	lending	to	private	business	was	
minimal.	Yet,	the	financial	reform	and	creation	of	Banco	de	España	in	the	1850s	did	not	end	
the	recourse	to	finance	debt	by	monetary	means;	it	will	turn	into	open	inflationary	finance	
policy	later	in	1883	with	the	inconvertibility	of	the	peseta	(Martin	Acena	1981	).	
Thus,	recurrent	deficits	were	increasingly	financed	with	debt	(which	was	often	re‐
structured)	or	money	creation	when	both	foreign	and	domestic	lenders	exhausted;	In	some	
countries	the	last	resort	eventually	was	money	creation	by	means	of	rigging	the	banks	like	
in	1840s	Spain,	debasing	the	currency	as	in	1830s	Mexico	or	1850s	Bolivia	or	just	printing	
fiat	money	as	in	Buenos	Aires	since	1826	(Mitre	1986);	(Tedde	1999;	Irigoin	2000;	Centeno	
2002),	(Torres	Medina	1998).This	also	triggered	a	remarkable	change	in	monetary	policy	
with	lasting	impact:	the	expansion	of		currency	to	meet	fiscal	disequilibrium	opened	an	
early	door	to	governments	to	use	money	as	a	fiscal	instrument.	Hence	depreciated	
exchange	rates	provided	also	additional	protection	and	stimulated	the	production	of	some	
exports	–	especially	when	international	prices	were	falling	‐	despite	scholar	insistence	on	
the	importance	of	tariffs	throughout	the	19th	century	(Coatsworth	and	Williamson	2004).	
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Effects	from	the	monetization	of	the	deficit	further	disintegrated	money	markets	and	
exacerbated	regional	and	political	tensions	within	a	formerly	integrated	monetary	union.	
According	to	Spanish	monetary	historians	a	‘contradictory’	monetary	policy	particularly	
after	1823	failed	to	attract	specie	to	the	mint	(Sarda,	1948),	imposing	substantial	
deflationary	effects	to	the	Spanish	economy	((Sardá	Dexeus	1947),	(Nogues‐Marco	
2005)for	a	qualification)	.	Throughout	a	systematic	–	but	unexplained‐	overvaluation	of	the	
silver	drove	specie	out	of	circulation;	e.g,	the	gold/silver	exchange	rate	was	1:15.2	in	UK,	
15.5	in	France	and	16.5	even	16.7	in	Spain,	so	‘Spanish	coins	were	hence	hoarded	or	
exported	en	masse’.	Thus	insufficient	circulating	medium	sustained	demand	for	lesser	
quality	French	coins	for	decades.	Liberal	governments	hoped	to	revert	this	early	in	the	
1820s	without	success.	The	1824	Restoration’	monetary	policy	was	notoriously	prejudicial	
and	the	flight	‘of	pesos	duros	or	fuertes’	continued	despite	large	foreign	loans.	Deflation	was	
significant	up	to	1830	but	continued	through	the	1840s	(Carreras	2005)(Table	16.9	p	
1288‐90)	despite	the	reopening	of	the	Barcelona	mint	and	renewed	coinage	in	Madrid	
(Sarda,	1948	80‐88).		Then	even	other	foreign	coins,	Mexicans	and	Portuguese,	entered	in	
circulation	for	greater	disorder.	However,	without	means	governments	were	unlikely	to	
run	effectively	a	mint	or	any	policy	on	foreign	exchange,	so	low	coinage	it	is	no	wonder.	
Yet	it	is	unclear	which	were	the	Spanish	silver	coins	that	were	dominant	in	circulation;	
according	to	Sarda	(p	67)	these	were	pesos	‘fuertes	of	duros’	with	higher	intrinsic	silver	
value	than	French	coins,	and	were	most	likely	good	Spanish	American	pesos.		As	in	Peru,	
and	elsewhere,	from	the	mid‐	1820s	to	the	mid‐	1830s	good	silver	coins	were	siphoned	off	
given	their	appreciation	in	France,	Britain	and	even	more	so	in	the	traditional	Asian	
markets.	Deflation	was	a	common	trait	in	these	economies	(Gootenberg	1990).	In	some	
silver	rich	countries	several	mints	appeared	and	cut	coins	of	various	qualities	–	some	of	
which	reasonably	should	have	ended	in	Spain	(Irigoin	2009	).	In	circulation	along	with	the	
francesas,	Gresham	effects	occurred	and	arguably	resulted	in	deflationary		consequences	as	
those	described	by	Sarda.	Notably	the	exchange	rate	of	sterling	and	the	French	franc	
remained	relatively	stable	throughout	the	period	1821‐1855	–	with	exceptional	blips	in	
1847	(Tedde	1999	table	V‐2	and	XI‐3),	(Prados	de	la	Escosura	1986)app	7.	As	the	banking	
system	was,	the	markets	for	money	and	exchange	were	highly	fragmented	adding	further	
transaction	costs	to	the	already	weak	integration	of	the	Spanish	domestic	economy	
(Nogues‐Marco	2015).			
Research	on	the	macroeconomic	situation	of	Spain	in	this	period	is	still	a	work	in	progress	
but	evidence	from	very	detailed	narratives	presents	the	problems	of	Spain	very	similar	in	
nature	to	those	of	her	former	colonies.	Whereas	in	some	parts	of	Spanish	America	inflation	
was	an	optimal	solution	to	debt	finances	in	times	of	war	(Bordo	and	Vegh	2002);	it	
continued	being	a	source	in	peaceful	times	and	for	economies	with	very	different	
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endowments	and	institutions	–	like	Bolivia	or	Buenos	Aires	still	by	the	1850s	(Irigoin	
2009).	The	lack	of	consensus	about	the	form	of	the	state,	about	the	sources	of	revenues	and	
the	liable	subjects,		and	the	disassociation	between	tax	collectors	and	bearers,	all	
contributed	to	a	very	low	collection	rate,	a	shallow	fiscal	base	and	ultimately	to	insufficient	
revenues.	In	a	political	regime	in	which	representation	bore	no	relation	with	taxation,	
governments	became	insolvent;	lacking	fiscal	capacity	or	legitimacy	(often	both),	taxation	
ought	to	happen	without	consent.		
	
Another	legacy	
Institutionalist	interpretations	of	Latin	American	long	run	development	customarily	assess	
her	performance	against	the	United	States’.	However,	the	political	and	fiscal	trajectories	of	
Spain’s	and	Britain’s	former	colonies	after	their	Independence	were	hardly	comparable.	As	
historian	Max	Edling	(Edling	2003)	rightly	explains,	the	revolution	in	the	British	colonies	
was	‘in	the	favour	of	government’,	not	‘against	the	government’	as	precisely	was	the	case	in	
the	Spanish	colonies.	This	difference	makes	the	comparison	of	their	respective	institutional	
paths	quite	problematic.	Moreover	considering	that	both	Spain	and	her	former	colonies	
were	in	similar	predicament	after	Independence	it	is	difficult	to	assign	it	as	a	prejudice	
from	the	colonial	legacy.	Under	British	rule	North	American	colonies	were	also	separated	
fiscal	and	political	units;	but	they	were	financed	by	a	metropolis	which	took	on	its	defence	
and	minimal	government	expenses.	Unlike	the	Spanish	settlements,	where	the	church	
provided	most	of	public	goods	with	substantial	funding	from	the	royal	purse,	the	British	
colonies	funded	public	goods	such	as	education	with	direct	taxes	raised	locally.	When	the	
French	Indian	War	in	the	1750s	and	1760s	demanded	further	revenues	–	or	to	the	colonies	
to	bear	part	of	the	fiscal	costs	‐	Parliament	met	fierce	resistance	to	further	(indirect)	
consumption	taxes	required	from	the	colonists23.	This	asymmetry	between	taxation	and	
representation	that	the	colonies	had	in	parliament	triggered	the	American	Revolution	and	
tax	resistance	continued	until	the	1790s.		
The	British	levied	direct	taxes	on	colonial	property	and	faculty	from	as	early	as	166024;	
however	no	comparable	taxes	were	charged	in	the	metropolis	where	direct	taxes	increased	
only	after	1792.	In	parliamentary	England	sources	of	direct	taxation	–mainly	land	‐had	
been	in	relative	decline	since	the	1690s.	For	most	of	the	18th	century	custom	and	excise	
made	the	bulk	of	her	revenues	(Ashworth	2003).	Apparently	the	fiscal	burden	was	low	in	
                                                            
23	The	Townshend	Act	followed	the	(repealed)	Stamp	Act,	the	Sugar	Act	and	others	sought	to	raise	revenue	in	
the	colonies	for	self‐maintenance.	It	culminated	with	the	Tea	Act	of	1773	and	protests	in	Boston.			
24	Faculty	taxes	were	levied	on	the	faculty	or	earning	capacity	or	persons	following	certain	trades	or	having	
certain	skills.		G.	Fisher,	History	of	Property	Taxes	in	the	US.	http://Eh.net/encyclopedia/history	–of‐property‐
taxes‐in‐the‐united‐states	accessed	on	3rd	January	2015		
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the	British	colonies	–	and	certainly	much	lower	than	in	the	metropolis.	However,	as	Zolt	
shows	‘representation	came	at	a	cost’	to	independent	US:	from	1792	to	1811	the	per	capita	
tax	take	increased	10	times	from	what	the	Empire	had	charged	in	1765‐1775.	(Zolt,	2009,	
455).	Direct	taxes	collected	by	local	government	did	not	cease	with	the	revolution	and	their	
income	represented	a	substantial	part	of	the	revenues	available	to	the	new	state	
governments.	By	1825	the	total	tax	take	of	the	US	government	was	$	4.33	per	person	of	
which	54%	corresponded	to	income	appropriated	by	the	state	and	local	governments	(Zolt,	
2009	table	1).		It	jumped	to	$	8.86	in	1855,	which	meant	more	than	double	in	real	terms	of	
the	1825	value25.	This	burden	was	certainly	much	higher	than	the	per	capita	contribution	
borne	by	Spanish	Americans	as	seen	in	table	426.		
This	growth	includes	the	extraordinary	fiscal	expansion	of	the	Federalist	period.	Only	in	
1787‐89	the	Philadelphia	Convention	incorporated	the	former	colonies	into	a	federal	
United	States	transforming	the	equal	representation	of	states	in	the	Continental	Congress	
for	the	proportional	representation	of	citizens	in	the	House	of	Representatives.		This	
political	experiment,	the	Confederation	in	which	Congress	took	the	governing	role	the	King,	
had	collapsed	under	the	compound	of	insolvency	and	currency	inflation	in	1782‐8827	
(Edling	2014).	As	part	of	the	Federalist	fiscal	program	the	federal	government	assumed	the	
debt	of	the	individual	states	and	paid	them	at	par	with	new	federal	public	bonds;	this	
significantly	relieved	the	state	governments	of	the	cost	of	the	transition	to	a	new	political	
order.	In	1790,	seventy	four	million	dollars’	worth	of	domestic	and	foreign	debt	–	about	
30%	of	GNP28	‐	were	consolidated	in	long	term	interest	bearing	bonds	which	the	federal	
government	serviced	regularly	with	revenues	from	trade	taxes.	Having	been	part	of	the	
fiscal	burden	levied	by	the	British,	the	US	government	appropriated	what	formerly	
belonged	to	the	empire.	The	tariff	was	a	prerogative	the	states	surrendered	to	the	federal	
government	by	the	Impost	Acts	of	1790.	Together	with	some	low	excise	taxes	on	alcohol,	
tobacco	and	sugar,	the	tariff	thereafter	made	70‐80%	of	the	federal	income	in	the	period.	
Customs	revenues	amounted	to	$	4.6	million	in	1792	(about	2%	of	GNP)	or	$1.36	per	
capita;	in	nominal	terms	they	doubled	by	1800,	tripled	by	1805	and	further	quadrupled	by	
1820.	By	1850,	the	tariff	at	$	39	million	–	or	$1.98	per	capita	‐	still	made	82%	of	the	federal	
revenues	(Finances	1870).		
                                                            
25	According	to	the	US	dollar	purchasing	power	www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/reativevalue.php	
accessed	Feb	6th	2015.	The	annualised	inflation	rate	in	the	period	was	‐0.45%	
26	The	US	dollar	and	the	Spanish	American	silver	peso	remained	legal	tender	at	par	until	1856.	
27	The	Constitutional	Convention	alienated	the	rights	to	coin	or	print	money	from	the	state	and	gave	the	
power	to	coin	to	the	federal	government	in	1792.	It	also	changed	the	states’	for	proportional	representation	
in	Congress.	
28	Of	the	$74million,	$12	to	$22	million	corresponded	to	the	states	debt.	GNP	and	Debt	data	from	Bordo,	M.	
and	C.	Vegh	(2002).	"What	if	Alexander	Hamilton	had	been	Argentinean?	A	comparison	of	the	early	monetary	
experiences	of	Argentina	and	the	United	States."	Journal	of	Monetary	Economics	49(3):	459‐494.	
	 .			
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What	sets	the	Federalist	and	Republican	programs	apart	from	the	Latin	American	fiscal	
reforms	‐	and	from	the	previous	disastrous	experience	of	the	Confederation‐	is	the	
extraordinary	capacity	the	federal	state	had	to	service	the	interest	and	principal	of	its	debt	
(Wallis	2000).	This	capacity	to	tax	was	not	available	to	governments	in	Spanish	America	–	
nor	in	Spain‐	not	because	of	the	type	of	levies,	but	because	governments	there	could	not	
establish	a	taxation	system	that	worked.	North	Americans	eventually	agreed	to	shoulder	
heavier	taxes	than	under	British	rule	(Edling,	2003,	156).	The	per	capita	burden	calculated	
by	tax	take	of	the	three	levels	of	government	combined	had	doubled	in	1855	from	the	per	
capita	contribution	of	1820,	meanwhile	population	had	tripled.	(Zolt,	2009	p	458).	So	even	
if	the	US,	like	Latin	American	republics,	relied	on	Customs	to	service	the	debt	the	argument	
about	the	colonial	fiscal	burden	in	the	case	of	Spanish	America	needs	some	closer	scrutiny	
to	substantiate.		
Prados	(2009)	explains	the	extremely	different	success	of	the	financial	origin	of	republics	
in	the	Americas	by	the	recurrence	of	deficits.	Latin	American	already	weak	governments	
were	further	prejudiced	by	vicious	circles	of	insolvency,	debt	and	inflation.	Indeed	the	
problem	was	the	impossibility	to	raise	debt	because	they	were	no	credible	payers29.	But	by	
looking	solely	at	the	federal	level	scholars	tend	not	to	see	the	real	size	of	the	fiscal	burden	
borne	by	the	US	taxpayer.	Considering	that	the	federal	burden	was	half	or	less	of	what	the	
three	levels	of	government	take	was,	it	means	that	there	was	a	significant	amount	of	money	
still	appropriated	by	local	and	state	treasuries.	This	income	was	originated	in	direct	taxes	
and,	more	importantly,	it	was	spent	on	education	and	infrastructure;	something	which	no	
fiscal	district	in	Spanish	America	was	remotely	able	to	dream	of	as	the	overwhelming	share	
of	expenses	went	to	war	(Centeno	2002)	
Spanish	American	(aspiring)	governments	in	capital	cities	were	charging	taxpayers	
elsewhere	with	indirect	trade	taxes;	the	latter	had	not	vote	or	say	on	the	spending	of	these	
revenues;	nor	there	were	channels	for	redistribution	as	the	transfers	that	had	formerly	
allowed	the	co‐optation	of	regional	elites	‐	even	if	for	marginally	productive	ventures.	
Indirect	taxation	without	representation	was	the	means	that	republican	governments	had	
to	establish	their	authority	at	the	centre	and	at	the	top	of	the	polity	in	Spanish	America.	For	
taxpayers	the	burden	was	greater	if	a	government	elsewhere	controlled	the	Custom	house	
at	the	port	or	the	tobacco	monopoly	–	as	in	landlocked	capitals	like	Bogota,	Mexico	and	
Santiago	de	Chile.	Relief	from	colonial	tax	burden	was	none	for	the	people	overall	–	if	any	it	
was	appropriated	by	elites	at	the	capital	cities	who	increasingly	restricted	political	
representation	of	territories	and	individuals.	Unsurprisingly	fiscal	federalism	failed.	
                                                            
29	The	Empire	of	Brazil	adds	an	interesting	twist	to	institutional	explanations	about	the	role	of	limited	
government	and	political	institutions	in	providing	secure	property	rights	and	hence	growth.		Summerhill,	W.	
(2015	(forthcoming)).	Inglorious	revolution:	political	institutions,	sovereign	debt,	and	financial	
underdevelopment	in	imperial	Brazil.	New	Haven,	Yale	University	Press.	
	 	
28 
 
Whereas	in	the	federal	US	some	states	even	invested	in	banks,	turnpike	and	canals	
construction	through	private	public	partnership	and	taxed	profits	from	banks	and	
insurance	companies	and	capital	gains	on	these	stocks	(Sylla	1999)	266.		Thus	some	states	
managed	to	fund	up	to	60	%	of	their	expenses	and	participated	of	the	greater	fiscal	capacity	
of	the	federal	state	which	relieved	them	from	the	old	debts.	The	federal	government	also	
shared	revenues	from	land	sales	and	taxes	on	businesses.	Furthermore	in	New	England	
these	revenues	were	sufficient	to	enable	some	reduction	or	elimination	of	state	property	
taxes	early	on.			
Scholars	have	shown	the	importance	of	state	revenues	for	the	provision	of	public	education	
in	the	US	(Go	and	Lindert	2007);	by	1820	the	Common	School	achieved	the	best	literacy	
rate	in	the	world	thanks	to	income	from	direct	taxes	invested	in	education	serving	a	broad	
population.	There	were	significant	regional	variations	among	states	however.	Zolt	argues	
that	this	explains	the	different	type	of	taxes	chosen	to	support	public	education	spending,	
and	hence	inequality	levels	within	the	US	(Zolt,	2009(Lindert	2004)).	Elsewhere	Sokoloff	
and	Zolt	have	related	this	to	the	contemporary	extension	of	the	franchise	in	the	US	
(Sokoloff	and	Zolt	2006)	179).	They	thus	explain	the	different	growth	performance	in	
South	and	North	America	in	the	provision	of	education	resultant	from	the	legacy	of	
inequality	that	taxation	imposed	in	each	part	of	the	continent.	The	channel,	they	argue,	was	
suffrage	institutions.	Thus,	allegedly	North	Americans	had	a	less	restricted	franchise,	
greater	turnout	at	the	ballots	and	a	vigorous	primary	education	funded	by	direct	taxation.		
Latin	Americans,	on	the	other	hand,	increasingly	had	more	restricted	franchise,	lower	
turnout	and	did	not	–	and	could	not‐	invest	in	education	to	account	for	(Curvale	and	
Przeworski	2008).	However,	only	the	Fifteenth	Amendment	to	the	Constitution	in	1870	
granted	all	US	male	citizens	the	right	to	vote;	and	most	blacks	were	yet	disenfranchised,	
banned	or	discriminated	at	the	ballots	until	the	Voting	Rights	Act	of	1965	made	suffrage	
universal.	Ironically	until	1964	five	southern	states	used	the	payment	of	poll	tax	as	
requirement	to	vote,	which	was	repealed	by	the	Twenty	Fourth	Amendment	–	yet	eight	
states	have	not	ratified	it	to	date.		
Notwithstanding,	Spanish	Americans	were	not	originally	precluded	from	voting	and	had	
significant	means	for	investing	in	education	at	their	disposal	–	at	the	rate	they	controlled	
the	colonial	treasuries.	Furthermore	every	early	constitutional	text	aimed	at	it.	However	
asymmetries	between	agents	deciding	collection	and	spending	of	revenues	from	mainly	
indirect	taxes	rendered	paltry	yields	to	the	Treasury.	Direct	taxation	in	the	US	proved	also	
an	advantage	for	more	equal,	better	educated,	societies	(in	some	states)	because	as	Zolt	
points	out	‘where	the	median	voter	has	less	income	than	the	mean,	the	median	voter	will	
favour	income	tax	regimes	under	which	her	share	of	taxes	will	be	less	than	their	share	of	
government	benefit	supported	by	the	tax	revenue’	(2009,	449).	This	theorem	may	not	work	
if	the	median	voter	pays	indirect	taxes	of	which	moreover	rates	are	decided	elsewhere	and	
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revenues	are	disinvested	from	public	goods	to	service	debt	or	eroded	by	inflation.		This	was	
the	situation	in	republican	Spanish	America,	where	a	substantial	provision	of	public	goods	
was	done	by	private	sources	like	the	church	and	charities	and	so	not	perceived	as	return	
for	taxation.	Similarly	a	number	of	private	goods	were	provided	by	public	sources	which	
made	the	‘developmentalism’	of	the	colonial	state;	thus	employment,	food	security	and	a	
host	of	subsidies	to	private	activities	were	then	understood	as	entitlements30.	In	this	case	
the	median	voter	would	dissociate	the	identity	between	revenue	and	expenditure	and	may	
unreasonably	prefer	lower	taxation	to	fund	lower	expenditure	–	if	there	were	no	real	
redistributive	effects	to	hope	for.		
	
Conclusions	
Weakened	governments	could	not	tax,	without	income	they	could	not	last	and	they	yet	had	
to	spend	ever	more	to	remain	in	power.	Political	instability	was	rooted	in	the	fiscal	fragility	
of	the	state	and	every	new	constitution	faltered	as	fast	as	the	previous	one.	Paradoxically	in	
Spanish	America,	instead	of	relieving	the	burden	from	the	colonial	taxation,	Independence	
weakened	yet	more	the	capacities	–fiscal,	legal	and	administrative‐	of	the	republican	state	
and	undermined	the	political	institutions	that	it	organized.		Over	time	–	because	of	inelastic	
expenses	from	political	turmoil	on	top	of	growing	demands	on	future	income	from	debt	
and	prejudices	from	monetary	disorder	‐	all	compounded	in	chronic	fiscal	deficits	and	
broken	governments.	Fiscal	basis	were	shallow	and	shrinking	as	countries	lost	import	or	
consumption	capacity	from	exchange	rate	problems	and	disintegrating	domestic	markets.	
Borrowing	further	at	shorter	terms	and	higher	interest	rates	led	governments	such	as	of	
Mexico’s	to	real	bankruptcy	within	30	years	(Tenembaun	1996,	Irigoin,	2009).	Other	
governments	with	even	lower	fiscal	capacity	inflated	their	debts	by	monetary	expansion	
like	Bolivia’s,	or	suffered	from	the	impossibility	to	execute	any	monetary	policy,	as	Spain	or	
Peru	until	the	1850s.	The	lack	of	consensus	about	the	form	of	the	state,	about	its	fiscal	basis	
and	the	disassociation	between	tax	collectors	and	bearers	ultimately	undermined	the	
capacities	of	the	(any)	state.	The	incidence	of	regressive	taxation	on	producers	(exporters)	
and	consumers	originated	large	redistribution	effects	which	further	aggravated	centrifugal	
tensions.			
Without	fiscal	capacity	neither	debt	service	nor	tax	smoothing	was	possible	for	Latin	
American	governments.	Lack	of	fiscal	capacity	and	regressive	taxation	had	persistent	
implications	in	the	making	of	the	republican	state.	For	instance	the	first	Mexican	
                                                            
30	The	‘developmentalist’	state	in	Spanish	America	is	explained	in	(Grafe	Irigoin	2012).	It	differs	substantially	
from	the	developmental	state	conceived	by	Robinson,	J.	and	S.	Pincus	(2015).	"Wars	and	State	Making	
Reconsidered:	The	Rise	of	the	Developmental	State."	Annales	Histoire,	Sciences	Sociales.	
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constitution	of	1824	devised	a	mechanism	to	incorporate	formerly	separate	19	treasury	
districts	into	a	federal	republic.		It	was	meant	to	be	a	compromise	between	states	and	
ayuntamientos	to	fund	the	fiscal	reorganization	of	the	new	federation.	Replicating	Cadiz’	
article	340	the	Mexican	congress	apportioned	each	state	contribution	by	a	poorly	defined	
combination	of	population	size	and	consumption,	ie.	The	Contingente.	The	political	
bargaining	was	extremely	difficult	and	returns	foundered	shortly:	they	made	24%	of	
federal	revenues	in	1824	and	originated	in	the	same	mining	regions	that	had	formerly	
transferred	large	shares	of	their	revenues	to	the	colonial	capital,	but	without	vote	or	voice	
(Arroyo	2006).	It	fell	to	a	10%	in	the	following	years	and	collapsed	further	to	3%	in	1831	
when	contributions	ceased;	meanwhile	total	revenues	of	the	federal	government	nearly	
halved.	Conversely,	in	the	US	when	in	needs	for	war	expenses	as	in	1812	the	federal	
government	could	temporarily	raise	an	extraordinary	federal	property	tax	among	the	
states	on	the	basis	of	population	to	great	effect.		Underpinning	the	failure	of	Mexican	fiscal	
federalism	–	comparable	to	other	experiments	in	Spanish	America	‐	was	the	protracted	
conflict	about	the	sources	of	national	revenues	and	the	form	of	the	state.		
In	the	process,	restrictions	to	suffrage	mounted	with	wealth	and	literacy	requirements	
throughout	Spanish	America;	elections	evolved	into	a	form	of	proclamation	of	every	new	
government	more	than	actually	an	organized	and	fair	competition	for	power.	The	early	
open	contest	for	the	popular	will	ran	out	of	funds	soon;	henceforth	governments	traded	
entitlements	for	support.	Political	strife	moved	from	the	ballots	to	the	battleground,	and	
further	to	the	streets.	Suffrage	lost	its	nature.	With	an	hoc	elections	representative	
democracy	in	Spanish	America	moved	one	step	towards	what	scholars	calls	a	‘Delegative	
Democracy’	(O'Donnell	1994)	as	opposed	to	a	representative	one.		In	this	environment	
there	were	no	effective	means	to	fund	governance	and	far	less	to	deliver	the	constitutional	
promises	of	public	education.		As	governments	resorted	to	even	more	perverse	means	to	
defray	expenses,	like	selling	massively	lands	at	once	when	relative	its	price	was	rising	from	
greater	labour	ratios	and	higher	prices	for	land	intensive	commodities	from	globalization,	
they	only	accelerated	already	high	levels	of	inequality.	Thus	in	19th	century	Spanish	
America	–	and	in	Spain‐	inequality	is	the	by‐product	of	another	institutional	legacy	other	
than	colonial	status.		Elites	on	the	other	hand	managed	to	deter	both	greater	fiscal	
extraction	from	governments	and	institutional	demands	for	political	redistribution	from	
fellow	citizens.	Fiscal	reforms	were	ineffectual	or	null	and	representation	was	increasingly	
more	restrictive.	Low	taxation	was	in	their	interest	as	they	could	acquire	public	goods	
privately.	For	the	masses	the	expectation	–	and	experience‐	of	public	provision	of	private	
goods	put	governments	in	the	position	of	continuous	patronage	in	order	to	buy	out	their	
legitimacy,	irrespective	of	the	financial	means	available.	Insolvency,	inflation	and	instability	
are	long	term	features	in	these	countries,	together	with	regressive	fiscal	policies.		Placing	
the	fiscal	burden	on	others	or	in	the	future	brought	elites	and	masses	together			in	a	
perverse	combination	of	low	taxation	and	representation.	This	intertemporal	trap	of	the	
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peculiar	Latin	American	political	and	macroeconomic	(dis)equilibrium	seems	to	be	indeed	
more	a	legacy	of	the	19th	century.		
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Martin	Acena,	P.	(1981	).	"Espana	y	el	Patron	Oro	(1880‐1913)."	Hacienda	Publica	Espanola	
69:	267‐290.	
	 	
Mitre,	A.	(1986).	El	Monedero	de	los	Andes.	Region	economica	y	moneda	boliviana	en	el	siglo	
XIX.	La	Paz,	HisBol.	
	 	
Nogues‐Marco,	P.	(2005).	"Análisis	de	la	deflación	española	de	la	primera	mitad	del	siglo	
XIX:	Una	comparación	internacional."	Revista	de	Historia	Económica		XXIII(2):	371‐405.	
	 	
Nogues‐Marco,	P.	H.,	A	(2015).	The	making	of	a	national	currency.	Spatial	transaction	costs	
and	money	market	integration	in	Spain	(1825‐1874).	
	 	
O'Donnell,	G.	(1994).	"Delegative	democracy?"	Journal	of	Democracy	5(1):	55‐69.	
	 	
Perez	Herrero,	P.	(2015/2009).	El	tratamiento	de	la	fiscalidad	en	las	constituciones	del	
mundo	atlantico	(1787‐1830).	El	liberalismo,	la	creacion	de	la	ciudadania	y	los	estados	
nacionales	occidentales	en	el	espacio	Atlantico	(1787‐1880).	P.	Perez	Herrero	and	I.	Simon	
Ruiz.	Bucaramanga,	Universidad	de	Alcala	‐	Univ.	Industrial	de	Santander:	163‐258.	
	 	
Platt,	D.	(1983).	"Las	finanzas	extranjeras	en	Espana,	1820‐1870."	Revista	de	Historia	
Economica	1(1):	121‐150.	
	 	
Platt,	T.	(1982).	Estado	boliviano	y	ayllu	andino:	Tierra	y	tributo	en	el	norte	de	Potosı́.	La	
Paz,	Instituto	de	Estudios	Peruanos.	
	 	
Posada‐Carbó,	E.,	Ed.	(1996).	Elections	Before	Democracy:	The	History	of	Elections	in	
Europe	and	Latin	America.	NY,	St	Martins.	
38 
 
	 	
Prados	de	la	Escosura,	L.	(1986).	"Una	serie	anual	del	comercio	exterior	(1821‐1913)."	
Revista	de	Historia	Economica	IV(1):	103‐150.	
	 	
Prados	de	la	Escosura,	L.	(1993).	La	perdida	del	Imperio	y	sus	consecuencias	economicas.	
La	Independencia	Americana:	consecuencias	economicas.	S.	Amaral	and	L.	Prados	de	la	
Escosura.	Madrid,	Alianza:	253‐300.	
	 	
Prados	de	la	Escosura,	L.	(2009).	"Lost	Decades?	Economic	Performance	in	Post‐
Independence	Latin	America				"	Journal	of	Latin	American	Studies.	41(2):	279‐307.	
	 	
Quijada,	M.	(2008).	"From	Spain	to	New	Spain:	Revisiting	the	Potestas	Populis	in	Hispanic	
Political	Thought."	Mexican	Studies/Estudios	Mexicanos	24(2):	185‐219.	
	 	
Robinson,	J.	and	S.	Pincus	(2015).	"Wars	and	State	Making	Reconsidered:	The	Rise	of	the	
Developmental	State."	Annales	Histoire,	Sciences	Sociales.	
	 	
Roca,	J.	(2007).	Ni	con	Lima	ni	con	Buenos	Aires.	La	formacion	de	un	estado	nacional	en	
Charcas.	Lima,	IDEA	Plural.	
	 	
Sanchez	Albornoz,	N.	(1978).	Indios	y	Tributos	en	el	Alto	Peru.	Lima,	Instituto	de	Estudios	
Peruanos.	
	 	
Sanchez	Santiro	,	E.	(2009).	Las	Alcabalas	Mexicanas,	1821‐1857.	Mexico,	Instituto	JLM	
Mora.	
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